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Sungjoon Cho♠ 
 
Abstract 
 
This article identifies a nascent phenomenon of “global constitutional 
lawmaking” in a recent WTO jurisprudence which struck down a 
certain calculative methodology (“zeroing”) in the antidumping area. 
The article interprets the Appellate Body’s uncharacteristic anti-
zeroing hermeneutics, which departs from a traditional treaty 
interpretation under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and 
the past pro-zeroing GATT case law, as a “constitutional” turn of the 
WTO. The article argues that a positivist, inter-governmental mode of 
thinking, as is prevalent in other international organizations such as 
the United Nations, cannot fully expound this phenomenon. Critically, 
this turn originates from bold ideas which envision, and thus 
“constitute,” new institutional meaning and possibilities within the 
WTO, which are anchored firmly by a discernible purpose of cabining 
trade distortive/restrictive consequences from the use of zeroing which 
have long been left unchecked. The legitimacy (sustainability) of such 
constitutional lawmaking can be secured not only by exogenous factors 
such as domestic political support but also by endogenous factors such 
as normative recognition by the domestic legal system 
(“internalization). 
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Introduction 
 Can we conceive “constitutional” norms at the global level 
beyond the nation state? Conventional international relations (IR) 
scholars may be lukewarm as to this c-word since it tends to menace 
their ontological premise, i.e., the state-centeredness. 1  This article 
                                                 
1 See J.H.H. Weiler & Joel P. Trachtman, European Constitutionalism and Its 
Discontents, 17 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 354, 363 (1996-97) (observing that the continued 
centrality of the national and the state is ontologically necessary to conventional IR 
scholars); Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International 
Regimes, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 621, 631 (2009) (stating that mainstream IR 
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challenges this mainstream view. It argues that under certain 
circumstances global organizations may self-generate constitutional 
norms in an effort to regulate states’ behaviors which ambiguous treaty 
provisions may not fully capture. The article finds a case in point in a 
recent development concerning a technical issue in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).2 The article explores the dynamic process of global 
constitutional law-making, namely how global organizations, such as 
the WTO, can actually build constitutional norms within their 
institutional contexts.3 
 Ironically, the WTO’s constitutional revolution originated from a 
rather unspectacular calculative methodology in the area of trade 
remedy (antidumping) labeled “zeroing.”4 Given that WTO texts do not 
explicitly prohibit such practice, public international law, considering 
the Lotus case5 and the principle of in dubio mitius,6 would recognize its 
members’ discretion to freely adopt the practice. In fact, as what might 
constitute “useful guidance,” 7 a panel under the old General Agreement 
                                                                                                                                 
theorists refused to recognize an international organization’s capacity to “develop 
autonomous capacities to produce, monitor, and enforce legal norms”).  
2 Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, April 15, 1994, 
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations [hereinafter WTO Agreement], LEGAL INSTRUMENTS–RESULTS OF THE 
URUGUAY ROUND [hereinafter RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND], 6, 6-18; 33 I.L.M. 
1140, 1144-1153 (1994). 
3 Karolina Milewicz, Emerging Patterns of Global Constitutionalization: Toward a 
Conceptual Framework, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 413, 422 (2009) (contending 
that global constitutionalism is a “process of continuous development,” rather than a 
“final good” akin to domestic constitutions). Importantly, this article does not address 
yet another critical aspect of global constitution lawmaking in the area of “human 
rights.” Regarding the human rights dimension of global constitutionalism, see 
Stephen Gardbaum, Human Rights as International Constitutional Rights, 19 EUR. J. 
INT'L L. 749, 768 (2008) (witnessing an ongoing process of implicit 
constitutionalization in the area of human rights in the international sphere).  
4  See generally Sungjoon Cho, The WTO Appellate Body Strikes Down the U.S. 
Zeroing Methodology Used in Antidumping Investigations, ASIL INSIGHTS (May 4, 
2006). 
5 SS Lotus (France v. Turkey) (1927), PCIJ Ser. A., No. 10, at 18-19 (stating that 
sovereign states enjoy “a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain 
cases by prohibitive rules.”). 
6 What is preferred under international law is “the less onerous meaning to the party 
which assumes the obligation, or which interferes less with the territorial and personal 
supremacy of a party, or involves less general restrictions upon the parties.” 1 OPPENHEIM'S 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992). 
7 Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Appellate Body Report adopted on November 1 
1996, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R [hereinafter Shochu II]; 
WTO Agreement, supra note _, art. XVI, para. 1 (“[T]he WTO shall be guided by the 
decisions, procedures and customary practices followed by the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES to GATT 1947 and the bodies established in the framework of GATT 1947”). 
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on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) previously upheld the same measure.8 
Moreover, the WTO Antidumping Agreement stipulates that when a 
provision “admits [] more than one permissible interpretation,” a WTO 
tribunal, such as the Appellate Body (AB), shall validate a domestic 
authority’s antidumping measure “if it rests upon one of those 
permissible interpretations.” 9  Under traditional rules on treaty 
interpretation under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT), the WTO tribunal would simply endorse the practice as it would 
interpret the Antidumping Agreement in a literal fashion.  
Surprisingly, however, the AB, in a series of high-profile decisions, 
recently struck down all types of zeroing methodology.10 These decisions 
are not a mere collection of inadvertent rulings on the same subject. 
Rather, they constitute a deliberate and systematic pattern toward a new 
jurisprudence in this area. Then, the question becomes whether, and 
how, the AB’s uncharacteristic stance could be justified in the face of 
traditional public international law, the GATT precedent, and the 
Antidumping Agreement, all of which appear to conflict with the AB’s 
position?  
This article construes the AB’s anti-zeroing position not as a 
simple jurisprudential change but as a more serious judicial revolution, 
which is tantamount to “constitutional lawmaking,” in a determined 
endeavor to contain WTO members’ manipulative use of zeroing 
methodologies under the subterfuge of the textual ambiguity of the 
relevant WTO norms. The AB, this article contends, has firmly 
recognized the structural damage that zeroing, if left unchecked, could 
inflict on the global trading system through the propagation of 
antidumping measures. At first glance, the AB’s departure from the old 
GATT case law might be neither inevitable nor stunning. Admittedly, 
not all interpretive shifts deserve the “constitutional” label. Critically, 
however, it is not the shift itself but the nature of the shift which should 
draw our attention to this development. Both the subject matter and the 
unique topicality of the zeroing decisions render the AB’s jurisprudential 
shift a constitutional lawmaking via international adjudication.  
First, despite the missing Constitution – with a capital “C” – 
global organizations may still need to re-configure the power allocated 
between themselves and their members with respect to measures which 
seriously undermine their ultimate object and purpose. To that end, 
certain fundamental (constitutional) norms within the meaning of the 
                                                 
8  EC – Anti-Dumping Duties on Audio Tapes in Cassettes Originating in Japan, 
ADP/136, Apr. 28, 1995 (unadopted) [hereinafter EC – Cassettes]. 
9 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note _, Annex 1A, art. 17.6 (ii) (emphasis added) 
[hereinafter AD Agreement]. 
10 See infra pt. II, § C. 
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WTO should tame an egregious form of protectionist politics which the 
zeroing practice denotes. The unparalleled evolution over a half century, 
from a provisional pact among a few contracting parties (GATT) to a 
full-blown multilateral trading system as a public good (WTO), tends to 
provide institutional maturity befitting such a constitutional mission.  
Markedly, global constitutional lawmaking in the form of 
constitutional adjudication in the WTO has not sprung from a vacuum. 
One can fully capture this nascent phenomenon only with critical 
appreciation of certain historical contexts, to wit the unique topicality of 
zeroing and antidumping measures at present.  
Trade remedies, such as antidumping measures, are widely prone 
to protectionism. 11  The use of antidumping remedies has recently 
skyrocketed as they are rapidly replacing more conventional trade 
barriers, such as tariffs and quotas, which rounds of trade talks have 
gradually demolished. WTO members now invoke antidumping 
measures competitively and with alarming frequency and intensity. 
Since the launch of the WTO in 1995, WTO members have initiated 
about 3,100 antidumping investigations. 12  In stark contrast, GATT 
contracting parties initiated only 1,600 investigations in the four 
decades before the 1980’s. More demoralizing is antidumping measures’ 
highly contagious nature.13 In what appears to be a defensive attack, new 
globalizers, such as India, Brazil and China, have now begun to imitate 
the developed countries’ penchant for antidumping suits.14  
What makes matters worse, the current global financial crisis has 
exacerbated this already alarming trend. In a protectionist reaction to 
the crisis, trading nations initiated more than two hundred new 
antidumping investigations in 2008, which is a stark increase of nearly a 
third from 2007. 15  Considering that zeroing can inflate dumping 
margins by as much as 90%,16 the practice is likely to fuel the abuse of 
                                                 
11 See generally Sungjoon Cho, Anticompetitive Trade Remedies: How Antidumping 
Measures Obstruct Market Competition, 87 N. C. L. REV. 357 (2009) (criticizing an 
inherently protectionist nature of antidumping measures).  
12  Regarding the antidumping statistics, see the antidumping section of the WTO 
website, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm [hereinafter WTO 
AD Website].  
13 Id. 
14 Major developing countries have increasingly used the antidumping measures since 
the launch of the WTO. See id. 
15 Chad P. Bown, Monitoring Update to the Global Antidumping Database, available 
at http://www.brandeis.edu/~cbown/global_ad/ (2009); WTO, WTO Secretariat 
Reports Increase of New Antidumping Investigations, Press 556, May 7, 2009. See 
also Robert Guy Mattews, Steelmakers Accuse China of Dumping in the U.S., WALL ST. 
J., Apr. 9, 2009 (reporting that the recent $2.7 billion antidumping suit launched by 
the U.S. steelmakers against Chinese exporters may be “a string of steel-dumping cases 
against China”). 
16 Daniel Ikenson, Antidumping Reformers Rejoice, Cato@Liberty, Dec. 18, 2006. 
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antidumping measures, if it remains intact. In short, zeroing could 
wreak havoc on the global trading system.  
These disturbing developments within the global trading system, 
have prompted the WTO high court (the Appellate Body) to cultivate a 
new hermeneutics on the WTO Antidumping Agreement, one that 
envisions new institutional meanings and possibilities within the WTO 
that resonate with its telos,17 “an integrated, more viable and durable 
multilateral trading system.”18 This critical choice flows from the AB’s 
awareness of immediate and powerful normative consequences which 
would affect the future of the WTO. In other words, the AB was well 
aware that the AB’s adjudication would “(re-) constitute” the WTO, at 
least as far as this particular topic (antidumping) is concerned. Here, the 
AB departed from a conventional role of a triadic settler (arbiter) of 
disputes, a role that applies given rules neutrally, and instead assumes 
the innovative role of a “constitutional court.”19 
At this juncture, articulating what this article does not present, or 
represent, might be in order. The article does not claim that its thesis 
provides an exclusive lens through which one may investigate 
constitutional phenomena in global organizations like the WTO. There 
are certainly different ways in which one can appreciate constitutional 
issues in those organizations from what this article suggests.20 Nor does 
this article attempt to construct a grand theory of the “WTO 
Constitution,” as many scholars appear to have undertaken.21 In essence, 
the article captures and theorizes one notable constitutional dynamic as 
it emerges in the WTO. 
Against this backdrop, my thesis of global constitutional 
lawmaking unfolds in the following sequence. Part I documents a 
jurisprudential transformation on the zeroing practice from the old 
GATT to the new WTO. The AB’s judicial abolition of zeroing is 
anchored firmly by a discernible purpose: avoiding unfairness from an 
undue inflation of dumping margins and minimizing uncertainty in 
administering antidumping measures. Methodologically, the use of 
                                                 
17 See Kenneth W. Abbott, “Economic” Issues and Political Participation: The Evolving 
Boundaries of International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 971, 974 (1996) 
(trenchantly submitting that political structures are not “corporeal” things whose 
existence derives from “constitutive ideas”). 
18 WTO Agreement, supra note _, pmbl. 
19 See Sweet, supra note _ , at 640 (highlighting the “constitutional jurisdiction” of the 
highest courts, such as the WTO Appellate Body, for reviewing members’ domestic 
measures in light of the WTO regime).  
20 See e.g., Sungjoon Cho, Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation: Moving 
Beyond the Entropic Dilemma, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 625 (2005) (analyzing “trade and …” 
issues from a constitutional standpoint). 
21 See infra note _. 
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interstitial norms, such as “fairness,” tends to furnish the AB with 
maneuvering room for this teleological interpretation.22 
Part II then attempts to theorize the AB’s judicial revolution on 
zeroing through the conceptual lens of “constitutional lawmaking,” 
which authoritatively re-configures the distribution of regulatory 
competence between the WTO and its members. This part highlights the 
AB’s innovative undertaking of constitutional adjudication as a vehicle 
for constitutional lawmaking in the WTO. It also discusses normative 
consequences of such constitutional lawmaking as they relate to WTO 
members and the WTO’s lower court (panel). Finally, it argues that the 
normative supremacy of constitutional norms created by constitutional 
lawmaking applies to both WTO members and panels. 
Part III defends the AB’s constitutional lawmaking in the form of 
constitutional adjudication. Admittedly, the AB’s constitutional 
adjudication is not without opposition. It has sparked harsh criticisms 
ranging from judicial activism 23  to a “kangaroo court.” 24  This part 
responds to these criticisms by contending that international tribunals, 
like domestic courts, often engage in judicial rule-making via 
construction beyond mere mechanical application of treaty provisions. It 
also warns that any “disarticulated,” self-righteous concept of 
sovereignty mobilized to foreclose necessary discussions in this area 
                                                 
22 Vaughan Lowe, The Politics of Law-Making: Are the Method and Character of 
Norm Creation Changing?, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 207, 212-21 (M. Byers ed., 2000) 
(observing that tribunals employ interstitial norms “not because those norms are 
obligatory as a matter of law, but because they are necessary in order that legal 
reasoning should proceed”). These interstitial norms function as “standards” vis-à-vis 
“rules” in an adjudicative setting. See Joel Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute 
Resolution, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 333, 350-55 (1999) [hereinafter Trachtman, The WTO’s 
Domain]. 
23 The United States, an ever-present defendant in these anti-zeroing decisions, has 
denounced the AB’s anti-zeroing position as an improper form of judicial legislation 
because it “[makes] up rules that the U.S. never negotiated.” See U.S. Sen. Comm. on 
Finance, News Release: U.S. Trade Laws and WTO, Sep. 27, 2002, at 
http://finance.senate.gov/press/pr092702.pdf. Likewise, others have also asserted 
that the AB has violated the sovereignty-preserving standard of review enshrined 
under Article 17.6 (ii) of the Antidumping Agreement, which they contend is modeled 
after the U.S.’ Chevron doctrine. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See also Roger P. Alford, 
Reflections on U.S. – Zeroing: A Study in Judicial Overreaching by the WTO 
Appellate Body, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 196, 200-02 (2006) (arguing that the AB 
should have upheld the zeroing practice, which domestic regulators saw as permissible 
under the Antidumping Agreement). 
24 See Gary G. Yerkey, Sen. Baucus Calls WTO ‘Kangaroo Court’ with Strong ‘Bias' 
Against the United States, 19 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1679 (2002); Congressional 
Record, S4308-26 (online ed., 14 May 2002). 
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does not do justice to the contemporary status of global market 
integration under the WTO system.25  
Part IV deals with an evaluative aspect of the thesis. It first 
observes that exogenous factors such as domestic political support may 
not exhaust legitimizing bases for global constitutional lawmaking. This 
part emphasizes that “endogenous” factors such as normative 
recognition by the domestic legal system (“internalization) will 
eventually secure the legitimacy (sustainability) of such constitutional 
lawmaking. 
Finally, this article concludes that constitutional culture in the 
global trading community, which harbors and promotes a legal 
discourse of constitutional jurisprudence among the community 
participants, is a critical catalyst for constitutional lawmaking. Because 
trade inherently connotes a “transnational” value, participants – 
importers, exporters, consumers and investors – of the global trading 
community tend to be susceptible to such discourse. It is this 
constitutional culture within the WTO that liberates us from myopic 
mercantilism, which zeroing embodies, and leads us to embrace 
constructive normative possibilities envisaged by the multilateral 
trading system, in particular amid the current global economic crisis. 
Only this liberation can redefine WTO members’ interests, and their 
identities, from unreceptive sovereigntists to enlightened norm-
builders.26 
 
I. A Judicial Revolution in the World Trade Organization  
A. “Zeroing”: The Epicenter of the Revolution  
Dumping is a pricing strategy under which foreign producers 
export their products at less than fair (normal) value, such as at prices 
lower than their home prices or at prices below the cost of production 
plus normal profits.27 Antidumping authorities and the beneficiaries of 
                                                 
25 Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International State, 88 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 384, 393 (1994); Thomas Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, 103 
ETHICS 48 (1992). 
26 See generally Sungjoon Cho, The WTO’s Gemeinschaft, 56 ALA. L. REV. 483 (2004) 
[hereinafter Cho, Gemeinschaft] ; Andrew T. F. Lang, Reconstructing Embedded 
Liberalism: John Gerard Ruggie and Constructivist Approaches to the Study of the 
International Trade Regime, 9 J. INT'L ECON. L. 81 (2006). From a standpoint of 
sociological institutionalism, Martha Finnermore envisioned “continuing and even 
increasing adherence to multilateralism – even when it runs contrary to expressed 
national interests – because it embodies some set of values central to the larger world 
culture.” Martha Finnemore, Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from 
Sociology’s Institutionalism, 50 INT’L ORG. 325, 339 (1996). 
27 19 U.S.C. § 1677(34) (stating that imports at less than fair value constitute dumping). 
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antidumping measures, i.e., domestic producers, attempt to justify the 
antidumping system as a bulwark against foreign producers’ alleged 
“unfair” trade practices which enable the latter to reduce the production 
cost.28 Since these discounted sales are legitimate under the domestic 
(antitrust) law, unless they are motivated by a predatory intent, i.e., to 
drive out rivals from the market, 29  a number of economists and 
policymakers view the antidumping system which lacks such strict 
requirement as a protectionist device.30 Yet the GATT/WTO “does not 
pass judgment” on the fairness of dumping.31 Instead, GATT Article VI 
authorizes importing countries to “condemn” dumping if it incurs 
material injury to domestic industries by imposing antidumping duties 
on dumped imports. 32  In other words, under these circumstances, 
importing countries may impose antidumping duties on dumped 
products to offset any allegedly unfair effects.  
Under a typical antidumping investigation, the amount of 
antidumping duties corresponds with the magnitude of dumping 
(“dumping margin”) which is defined as a gap between domestic price 
(normal value) and export price. In the United States, the Department of 
Commerce (DOC) calculates dumping margins. The DOC determines an 
overall dumping margin over a particular product under investigation by 
adding up multiple dumping margins (“Potential Uncollectible Dumping 
Duties” or “PUDD”) collected from various sub-product groups 
(“averaging groups” specified by “Control Numbers” or “CONNUM”) of 
the same product. 33  In doing so, the DOC ignores (“zeros”) any 
“negative” PUDD (any excess of export prices over normal values) in 
each group. Consequently, an overall dumping margin (a total sum of 
multiple PUDDs) is inflated since the zeroing methodology prevents 
those negative individual dumping margins (PUDDs) from offsetting 
positive individual dumping margins (PUDDs). According to one study, 
dumping margins would have been 86 percent lower if zeroing had not 
                                                 
28  See BRINK LINDSEY & DANIEL J. IKENSON, ANTIDUMPING EXPOSED THE DEVILISH 
DETAILS OF UNFAIR TRADE LAW, xi (2003). 
29  However, “predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely 
successful.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 589 (1986). 
30 Alan Greenspan once observed that antidumping remedies are “just simple guises 
for inhibiting competition” imposed in the name of “fair trade.” Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
Antidumping Law as a Means of Facilitating Cartelization, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 725, 
725 (2000) (quoting the former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan, 
Remarks Before the Dallas Ambassadors Forum, Dallas, Texas (Apr. 16, 1999)). 
31 WTO AD Website, supra note _. 
32 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, October 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 
U.N.T.S. 187, art. VI; AD Agreement, supra note _, art. 1.  
33 Regarding the detailed methodology of the DOC’s calculation of dumping margins, 
see U.S. Department of Commerce (Import Administration), Antidumping Manual, ch. 
6 (Fair Value Comparisons), available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/admanual/index.html 
[hereinafter AD Manual].  
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been employed. 34  The DOC uses this methodology not only in an 
original investigation but also in the subsequent stage of investigation, 
such as an “administrative review” under which it may annually 
compute a company-specific dumping margin upon a request by 
interested parties.35 
Suppose that a foreign widget producer makes two U.S. sales.36 
The first U.S. sale (export) concerns Model A, and is given CONNUM #1. 
This sale is made at fifty cents per unit with 100 units. The second sale 
involves Model B, and is accorded CONNUM #2. This sale is made at a 
dollar and fifty cents per units with 100 units. The weighted-average 
normal value (home market price) is one dollar in both sales. The 
weighted-average margin for the first and the second sale is 50 cents 
and minus 50 cents, respectively. Each PUDD is calculated as a unit 
margin multiplied by total units sold. In the U.S. sale No.1 (CONNUM 
#1), the PUDD is 50 dollars, while in the U.S. sale No.2 (CONNUM #2) 
the PUDD is minus 50 dollars. The total PUDD is a sum of these 
individual PUDDs. In this example, the total PUDD would be 0 (50 
minus 50) dollars.  
However, under the zeroing practice the DOC ignores (“zeros”) 
any negative PUDD before summing up. Therefore, the total PUDD in 
this example is still 50 (50 plus 0) dollars, and the (weighted-average) 
dumping margin, which is total PUDD/total value of U.S. sales, is 25% 
(50/(50+150)). In sum, the dumping margin is inflated by 25% in this 
hypothetical case on account of zeroing because it would have been 0% 
((50-50)/(50+150)) without zeroing. This zeroing practice under the 
ordinary (weighted average-to-weighted average) comparison method is 
called “model zeroing.”37 In the administrative review, as in an ordinary 
investigation process, any negative individual dumping margins (such as 
weighted average normal value minus individual export prices) are 
zeroed, which is called “simple zeroing.”38  
B. The Ancien Régime: The Old GATT Jurisprudence on 
Zeroing39  
 In EC – Audio Cassettes (1995), Japan complained that the EC’s 
zeroing practice led to arbitrary results in the calculation of dumping 
                                                 
34 Ikenson, supra note _.  
35 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) (periodically reviewing the amount of the antidumping duty). 
36 AD Manual, ch. 6, supra note _.  
37  United States - Laws, Regulations, and Methodology for Calculating Dumping 
Margins (“Zeroing”), Panel Report circulated on Oct. 31, 2005, para. 2.3.  
38 Id., para. 2.5. 
39 Unlike the WTO, under the old GATT system any party, including a losing party, 
could “veto” the adoption of a panel report so that the report would not be legally 
“binding.” However, even such an unadopted report is still regarded as a useful legal 
guidance. See Shochu II, supra note _.  
[2009] Global Constitutional Lawmaking 
 
10 
margins since the practice tended to inflate dumping margins vis-à-vis 
the normal averaging (non-zeroing) methodology. 40  Japan therefore 
argued that such methodology violated Article 2 (paragraphs 1 and 6) of 
the Tokyo Round Antidumping Code requiring “fair comparison” 41 as 
well as Article 8 (paragraph 3) stipulating that the amount of 
antidumping duties should not exceed the actual dumping margin.42 
However, the EC responded that Article 2 concerned only those 
circumstances in which normal prices exceed export prices and did not 
cover the opposite situation where export prices exceed normal prices.43 
While Japan accentuated the unfairness of zeroing by highlighting the 
eventual consequences of zeroing, the EC simply adopted the narrow 
textualist reading of Articles 2 and 8 from which it attempted to 
legitimize the zeroing methodology. 
The panel sided with the EC in its decision which was reminiscent 
of the Lotus doctrine.44  The panel opined that nothing in Article 2 
prevented the EC from adopting other calculative methodologies than 
normal averaging. 45  Therefore, an antidumping authority would not 
need to consider any negative dumping margins because it would obtain 
a separate dumping margin from each comparison between a price of a 
particular transaction in the home market (a normal value) and a price 
of yet another particular transaction in the export market (an export 
price). Whenever, an export price exceeds a home price, such a negative 
margin instantaneously becomes a zero margin under this single 
transaction framework.46 
 Under the panel’s approach, antidumping authorities would 
enjoy an option not to “aggregate” multiple results of multiple individual 
comparisons between home and export transactions. Such option tends 
to render fortuitous, and thus insignificant, the eventuality of final 
dumping margins being exaggerated. Here, the panel ignored the 
general necessity of aggregating multiple results of comparison in any 
comparison methodology. It assumed, wrongly, that the necessity of 
aggregation would occur only under an average-to-average comparison 
methodology. Therefore, the panel rejected Japan’s argument for the 
                                                 
40 EC – Cassettes, supra note _, para. 115. 
41  The same rule now appears in Article 2 (paragraphs 1 and 4) of the WTO 
Antidumping Agreement. 
42 The same rule now appears in Article 9 (paragraph 3) of the WTO Antidumping 
Agreement. 
43 EC – Cassettes, supra note _, para. 119. 
44 See supra note _. 
45 EC – Cassettes, supra note _, para. 350. 
46 Id., para. 356 (“[I]f the existence and extent of dumping and the imposition of duties 
had been conducted on a transaction-to-transaction basis, the EC would have been 
entitled to impose a duty with respect to dumped transactions, where injury existed, 
irrespective of the prices at which other undumped transactions occurred.”). 
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aggregation by opining that Article 2 would not require antidumping 
authorities to use exclusively the average-to-average comparison 
methodology.47  
 The panel report was unadopted, reflecting high political profiles 
which it engendered. Subsequently, despite intense negotiations under 
the Uruguay Round, WTO members failed to provide clear rules on 
zeroing. 48  As a result, this controversial practice had been quite 
prevalent among the main users of antidumping remedies, such as the 
U.S. and the EU, when India challenged the practice for the first time 
under the WTO system.49 
C. The Making of the Revolution: The Anti-Zeroing 
Jurisprudence in the WTO  
1. The Genesis  
a. EC – Bed Linen (2001) 
Echoing EC – Audio Cassettes, the EC clung to strict textualism 
and argued that Article 2 (Determination of Dumping) of the WTO 
Antidumping Agreement rendered no guide on how to combine 
individual dumping margins for specific product types to calculate an 
overall rate of dumping margin for the product under investigation.50 
The EC viewed that a “dumping margin” under the Agreement could be 
established “for each product type or for each individual transaction” as 
well as for the product as a whole.51 It would not be difficult to read 
between the lines of the EC position. To implement the zeroing 
methodology, one should logically recognize each transaction as a 
separable segment (an individual transaction or a sub-product category) 
of the product under investigation. Only in this way, can one avoid 
including negative individual dumping margins in the calculation of an 
overall dumping margin for the product as a whole. In other words, this 
fragmentation of a product into autonomous transactional units 
prevents any negative results in one sub-product (transaction) category 
from offsetting any positive results in other sub-product categories.  
However, in a surprising hermeneutical turn from the old GATT 
jurisprudence the AB rejected the EC position. It ruled that the dumping 
                                                 
47 Id., para. 358. 
48 Terence P. Stewart, Antidumping, in THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING 
HISTORY (1986-1992), vol. 2, 1383, 1540 (Terence P. Stewart ed. 1993). 
49  See John Greenwald, WTO Dispute Settlement: An Exercise in Trade Law 
Legislation?, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 113, 118 (2003) (observing that zeroing has been a 
common practice in the antidumping communitry).  
50 European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed 
Linen from India, Appellate Body Report adopted on Mar. 12, 2001, WT/DS141/AB/R, 
para. 11 (emphasis original) [hereinafter EC – Bed Linen].  
51 Id., para. 12 (emphasis original).  
[2009] Global Constitutional Lawmaking 
 
12 
margin should be established “for the product – cotton-type bed linen – 
and not for the various types or models of that product.” 52 The EC 
should have “compare[d] the weighted average normal value with the 
weighted average of prices of all comparable export transactions,” which 
include those transactions with negative individual dumping margins.53 
Therefore, the EC failed to take into account these transactions by zeroing 
the minus dumping margins.54 The AB invoked a general obligation of 
“fair comparison” under Article 2 as it implied that the zeroing 
methodology would entail unfair results.55 This is exactly what Japan had 
presented in the EC-Audio Cassettes. Japan’s position, which had been 
rejected by a GATT panel in 1995, was finally vindicated by the AB in this 
case. This is the very first AB decision which struck down the zeroing 
practice. Yet it was just a beginning of the WTO anti-zeroing 
jurisprudence.  
b. U.S. – Softwood Lumber V (2004) 
The AB in this case reaffirmed the case law established in EC – 
Bed Linen which defined dumping in terms of “a product as whole,” not 
narrowly for “a type, model, or category of that product.”56 The AB de-
legitimized the U.S. zeroing methodology by denying its calculative 
selectiveness embedded in zeroing. It viewed that the “results of the 
multiple comparisons at the sub-group level” are “only intermediate 
calculations,” not the dumping margin for the purpose of the WTO 
Antidumping Code. 57  The logical conclusion is therefore that an 
antidumping authority should “aggregate” all of these intermediate 
calculations regardless of being plus or minus. 58  Because zeroing 
basically cherry-picks only positive results of these intermediate 
calculations in the situation of multiple comparisons and disregards 
(zeroes) negative ones, it does “not take into account the entirety of the 
                                                 
52 Id., para. 53 (emphasis original).  
53 Id., para. 55 (emphasis original). 
54 Id. 
55 Id., para. 59 
56 United States - Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada, 
Appellate Body Report adopted on Aug. 31, 2004, WT/DS264/AB/R, paras. 95-96 
[hereinafter U.S. – Softwood Lumber]. 
57 Id., para. 97. 
58 Id. Those who do not recognize this essential principle of “aggregation” argue that 
the negation of zeroing would be tantamount to a situation in which “a driver should 
not be found guilty of speeding if, along other portions of the road, he was driving 
under the speed limit.” Alford, supra note _, at 208 (quoting Stewart, supra note _, at 
1540). Yet this is a flawed analogy. Any individual incidence of speed-driving is an 
independent infringement, while an individual computation outcome between normal 
value and export price in a single transaction is mere an intermediate step to reaching 
a dumping margin. A dumping margin presupposes a process of combination or 
aggregation, if there are multiple transactions under investigations. 
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prices of some export transactions” and thus “inflates the margin of 
dumping for the product as a whole.”59 
2. The Expansion 
a. U.S. – Zeroing (EC) (2006) 
Mirroring the EC’s earlier position in the EC – Bed Linen, the U.S. 
argued that the dumping margin “could be interpreted as applying on a 
transaction-specific basis.”60 However, in line with the previous case law 
in EC – Bed Linen and U.S. – Softwood Lumber V, the AB rejected this 
argument by reconfirming that the dumping margin should be 
established “for each known exporter or producer concerned of the 
product under investigation,” as stipulated in Article 6.10 of the WTO 
Antidumping Agreement. 61  The AB viewed that such interpretation 
would be consistent with the goal of an antidumping regime which is 
“designed to counteract the foreign producer's or exporter's pricing 
behaviour.”62 
In particular, the AB ruled that zeroing was also illegal in the 
“administrative review” process, besides in the original investigation 
process. An administrative review refers to a process under which upon 
the request of interested parties the antidumping authority (DOC) 
annually calculates the amount of antidumping duties owed by each 
individual importer by comparing the price of each individual export 
transaction with a monthly average normal value. 63  The DOC then 
aggregates the results of these comparisons and calculates the rate for 
each importer as a percentage of her total imports in the U.S.64 The AB 
opined that the DOC’s “systematic” disregard of negative individual 
dumping margins before aggregating these individual dumping margins 
resulted in an increased rate of dumping for the importer. The AB ruled 
that such systematic disregard violated Article 9.3 of the WTO 
Antidumping Agreement and GATT Article VI:2 both of which stipulate 
that an antidumping duty shall not exceed a dumping margin. 
The AB based its decision strictly on textual grounds and justified 
it from the standpoint of “customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law” under the Vienna Convention on the Law of the 
Treaties. 65  The AB might want to deflect the potential criticism of 
                                                 
59 U.S. – Softwood Lumber, supra note _, paras. 98, 101 (emphasis original). 
60  United States - Laws, Regulations, and Methodology for Calculating Dumping 
Margins (“Zeroing”), Appellate Body Report adopted on May 9, 2006, 
WT/DS294/AB/R, para. 128 [hereinafter U.S. – Zeroing (EC)]. 
61 Id. 
62 Id., para. 129. 
63 Id., para. 109. 
64 Id. 
65 Id., para. 134. 
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judicial activism in relation to Article 17.6 (ii) through this ostensibly 
literal interpretation. It seemed to be a wise move since rejecting zeroing 
through pure construction would have engulfed the AB with heavier 
attacks than it has invited under the current interpretation.  
Interestingly, the AB opened a window for future “as such” 
complaints against zeroing by endorsing the panel’s finding that zeroing 
“does have general and prospective application.”66 
b. U.S. – Softwood Lumber V (Article 21.5 – Canada) (2006) 
The U.S. challenged the AB’s emphasis on “multiple 
comparisons” on which the AB based its prohibition of zeroing. The U.S. 
argued that the AB’s position would render “illusionary” the U.S. “right 
to choose” different methods in calculating dumping margins. 67 
According to the U.S., WTO members can elect not to aggregate multiple 
comparisons. In particular, the U.S. presented a seemingly plausible 
argument under Article 2.4.2 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement. The 
AB’s “product as a whole” approach in the previous cases would not 
make sense in a “targeted dumping” scenario under the Article (a 
“pattern of export prices which differ significantly among different 
purchasers, regions or time periods”) because two different dumping 
margins would occur for the same product, i.e., “one margin of dumping 
for transactions falling within the specified pricing pattern and another 
for all other transactions”68 Moreover, without zeroing the Article itself 
would be meaningless since two different methodologies, i.e., the 
“weighted average-to-transaction comparison” for a targeted dumping, 
and the “weighted average-to-weighted average comparison” for normal 
scenarios, would produce the “mathematically equivalent” results.69 
 However, the AB blatantly dismissed the U.S. arguments. It 
viewed them as a “non-tested hypothesis” since the U.S. “has never 
applied” the weighted average-to-transaction methodology under the 
second sentence of the Article (targeted dumping), nor “has it provided 
examples of how other WTO Members have applied this 
methodology.”70 In addition, according to the AB the “mathematically 
equivalent” outcome would be at best “limited to a specific set of 
circumstances.”71  
 Having condemned the zeroing practice under the 
aforementioned hypothetical scenario (the weighted average-to-
                                                 
66 Id., para. 204 (emphasis added). 
67 United States - Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada 
(Article 21.5 – Canada), Appellate Body Report adopted on Sep. 1, 2006, 
WT/DS264/AB/RW, para. 33 [hereinafter U.S. – Softwood Lumber (Article 21.5)]. 
68 Id., para. 36. 
69 Id. 
70 Id., para. 97. 
71 Id., para. 99. 
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transaction comparison in a targeted dumping), the AB further moved to 
strike down zeroing in yet another comparison methodology under the 
Article, i.e., a “transaction-to-transaction” comparison for the same 
reasons on which it based its previous rulings as to zeroing. It held that 
“the use of zeroing under the transaction-to-transaction comparison 
methodology is difficult to reconcile with the notions of impartiality, 
even-handedness, and lack of bias reflected in the "fair comparison" 
requirement in Article 2.4” because it “distorts” certain export 
transactions (in that they are eventually zeroed) and consequently 
“inflates” dumping margins.72 
3. The Solidification  
 a. U.S. – Zeroing (Japan) (2007) 
 The AB’s anti-zeroing jurisprudence has reached its climax in 
this case. The decision, which was dubbed the “death knell of zeroing,”73 
has been the most sweeping and unyielding one of all zeroing decisions 
in the WTO thus far. The AB struck down the U.S. use of the zeroing 
methodology as such in a transaction-to-transaction (T-T) comparison 
as well as in a weighted average-to-transaction (W-T) comparison. It 
also illegalized zeroing under three types of administrative review 
(periodic review, new shipper review and sunset review) both as such 
and as applied. The U.S. repeated its previous defense that the zeroing 
issue must be addressed “separately for each comparison methodology 
and for each type of anti-dumping proceeding”74 so that an antidumping 
authority can enjoy the maximum discretion in its methodological 
choice among different types of comparisons.75 
 Markedly, in addition to its previously seen recourse to textual 
grounds76 and practical damages to exporters due to the inflation of 
dumping rates, 77  the AB rejected the U.S. argument from a rather 
“teleological” standpoint, taking into account one of the most 
                                                 
72 Id., paras. 138-40. Furthermore, the AB noted that the unfair effects of zeroing tend 
to be more serious in the transaction-to-transaction comparison than in the weighted-
average-to-weighted-average comparison because in the latter situation zeroing is 
performed after individual transactions were grouped and averaged, while in the 
former situation “excludes ab initio the results of all the comparisons in which the 
export prices are above normal value.” Id., para. 141. 
73  Daniel Pruzin, Latest WTO Ruling May Spell End of U.S. Use of Zeroing 
Methodology, 24 Int’l Trade Rep. 83, Jan. 18, 2007.  
74 United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews, Appellate Body 
Report adopted on Jan. 23, 2007, WT/DS322/AB/R, para. 87 [hereinafter U.S. – 
Zeroing (Japan)]. 
75 Id., paras. 19, 21. 
76 Id., para. 115. 
77 Id., para. 123. 
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paramount values of the global trading system, i.e., certainty and 
predictability. It held that: 
126. (…) If it is permissible to determine a separate margin of 
dumping for each transaction, the consequence would be that 
several margins of dumping could be found to exist for each 
known exporter or foreign producer.  The larger the number of 
export transactions, the greater the number of such transaction-
specific margins of dumping for each exporter or foreign 
producer.  This would create uncertainty and divergences in 
determinations to be made in original investigations and 
subsequent stages of anti-dumping proceedings.78 
 As the culmination of a series of anti-zeroing decisions for the 
last several years, this ruling’s disciplinary range is quite broad, covering 
nearly all comparison methodologies not only in the original 
investigation but also in the different administrative review procedures. 
This ruling seems to have delivered a clear message to the global trading 
community that the era of zeroing is gone.  
b. U.S. – Zeroing (Mexico) (2008) 
 In a shocking move, the panel in U.S. – Zeroing (Mexico) 
explicitly defied the AB’s established anti-zeroing position and instead 
reverted to the findings of panels in U.S. – Zeroing (EC) and U.S. – 
Zeroing (Japan) which had upheld the “simple zeroing” in the 
administrative (periodic) review.79 The panel in U.S. – Zeroing (Mexico) 
emphasized that panels “are not, strictly speaking, bound by previous 
Appellate Body or panel decisions that have addressed the same 
issue.”80 Interestingly, it found support for its position in Article 19.2 of 
the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) which prohibits the panel 
and the AB from “adding to or diminishing” WTO members’ rights and 
obligations.81 It also claimed that its reversal of the AB’s position in this 
issue is in pursuit of its obligation of an “objective examination” under 
Article 11 of the DSU. 
 The AB, as had widely been predicted, reversed the panel’s 
findings on the U.S.’ simple zeroing practice and invalidated this 
                                                 
78 Id., para. 126 (emphasis added). 
79 U.S. – Zeroing (Mexico), infra note _, paras. 7.106, 7.115. A “simple zeroing” refers 
to the zeroing practice adopted under “weighted average-to-transaction” (W-T) or 
transaction-to-transaction (T-T) comparisons between export price and normal value. 
The simple zeroing is often conducted in the administrative (periodic) review which 
starts after a year from the publication of antidumping duties. In contrast, the zeroing 
practice under weighted average-to-weighted average comparisons is called a “model 
zeroing.”  
80 Id., para. 7.102. 
81 Id. 
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methodology both “as such” and “as applied.”82 The AB rejected the 
panel’s premise that there can be multiple dumping margins, and 
emphasized that dumping (and dumping margin) is an “export-specific” 
concept which should be defined in terms of a product as a whole, based 
on the textual interpretation of GATT Articles VI:1, VI:2 and VI:6(a) as 
well as WTO Anti-Dumping Code Articles 2.1, 2.3, 3.4, and 5.1.83 The AB 
also justified its position by the “context” found in various other related 
provisions of the WTO Anti-Dumping Code, such as Articles 5.2(ii), 5.8, 
6.1.1, 6.7, 6.10, 8.1, 8.2, 9.4, 9.5 and 11.84 Interestingly, the AB confirmed 
that both French and Spanish versions of Article 6.10 of the WTO Anti-
Dumping Code represent one single dumping margin (“une marge” and 
“el margen,” respectively). Finally, the AB expressed its deep concern 
over the panel’s rebellious behavior.85 
c. U.S. – Continued Zeroing (2009) 
In this decision, the AB delivered a coup de grâce to the zeroing 
methodology in its entirety. Regarding the “continued use of the zeroing 
methodology in successive proceedings” as measures, the AB sent an 
unequivocal signal that the simple zeroing, which the U.S. had 
continued to use in the periodic and subset reviews in defiance to the 
previous AB decisions, was illegal.86 The AB’s position was particularly 
definite in that it captured even the aforementioned “ongoing conduct” 
as a reviewable measure.87 In a rare Concurring Opinion, a member of 
the AB warned future panels not to further disobey the AB’s anti-zeroing 
jurisprudence by relying on rulings of the previous defiant panels 
(“pick[ing] over the entrails of battles past”).88 
In a similar tenor, the AB ruled firmly against the U.S.’ recurring 
claim that the panel violated the standard of review under Article 17.6 
(ii) of the Antidumping Agreement. The AB’s hermeneutics was basically 
teleological in this ruling. The AB rejected the AB’s self-serving 
construction of the term “permissible” by highlighting that “multiple 
meanings of a word or term [do not] automatically constitute 
"permissible" interpretations within the meaning of Article 17.6(ii).”89 
For the purpose of a “harmonious and coherent” interpretation, the AB 
                                                 
82 United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, 
WT/DS344/AB/R, Appellate Body Report circulated on Apr. 30, 2008 [hereinafter AB 
Report, U.S. – Zeroing (Mexico)]. 
83 Id., paras. 83-86. 
84 Id., paras. 87-93. 
85 Id., para. 162. 
86 United States – Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology, 
WT/DS350/AB/R, Appellate Body Report circulated on Feb. 4, 2009, para. 185 
[hereinafter AB Report, U.S. – Continued Zeroing]. 
87 Id., para. 181. 
88 Id., para. 312. 
89 Id., para. 268. 
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prioritized the first sentence of Article 17.6 (ii), which provides the law 
of treaty interpretation under the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, over the second sentence, which endorses “permissible” 
interpretations. 90  Under the AB’s “holistic” interpretation, the first 
sentence informs the second one, not vice versa.91 In other words, the 
critical role of “object and purpose” of a treaty in clarifying textual 
ambiguities, which is enshrined in the first sentence, should eventually 
“narrow the range of interpretations” under the second sentence.92 
 
II. Interpreting the Revolution: Toward Global Constitutional 
Lawmaking 
A. Putting the Zeroing Jurisprudence in Constitutional 
Perspectives 
1. Constitutional Adjudication as Constitutional Lawmaking 
Capturing the constitutionality of the WTO’s new jurisprudence 
on zeroing involves “a dialogue of imagination and possibility” in that it 
produces a new way (theory) of observing this particular reality 
(zeroing). 93  It is a daunting challenge since the terminology 
(constitution) is innately elusive and resistant to any fixed meaning.94 A 
recently emerging wide spectrum of narratives on trade constitution95 
                                                 
90 Id., paras. 268-72. 
91 Id. 
92 Id., para. 273. 
93 Joel P. Trachtman, The Constitutions of the WTO, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 623, 623, 645 
(2006) [hereinafter Trachtman, Constitutions]. 
94 Deborah Z. Cass, The ‘Constitutionalization’ of International Trade Law: Judicial 
Norm-Generation as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International 
Trade, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 39, 40-41 (2001) (observing difficulties in defining 
constitutionalism in the WTO context). 
95 For example, Jeffrey Dunoff offered three (institutional, normative and judicial) 
lenses through which one could capture trade constitution. Dunoff located an 
“institutional” lens in John Jackson’s classical framework of the multilateral trading 
system (GATT/WTO) under which a constitutional transformation from a “power-
oriented” regime to a “rule-oriented” system through a development (evolution) of 
institution, i.e., the “structure and machinery” of an organization. Dunoff also 
discovered a “normative” lens in Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann’s thesis which views the 
WTO’s constitutionalism as pre-commitments on fundamental values, such as market 
freedom or non-discrimination. According to Petersmann, WTO constitutionalism 
effectively disciplines national policies “which tend to limit economic freedom to 
domestic citizens and, for centuries, have discriminated against foreign goods, foreign 
services and foreign consumers.” Finally, Dunoff unearthed a “judicial” (or 
“jurisprudential”) lens of trade constitution in Deborah Cass’ thesis which focuses on 
certain constitutional principles which the WTO tribunal has increasingly invoked in 
shaping its decisions. Dunoff, supra note _ , at 651-56. 
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appears both useful and distracting. While these narratives may provide 
us with helpful cognitive frameworks by which we can re-formulate the 
AB’s zeroing rulings on a more profound ground, various taxonomies 
and perspectives which attempt to define trade constitution on their 
own terms often complicate a coherent understanding of this tricky 
notion. Nonetheless, certain critical elements, such as the subject-matter, 
the function of adjudication and the milieu, tend to characterize in 
combination the nature of constitutionalism or constitutionality within 
the WTO for the purpose of this article.  
 First, constitutional adjudication basically addresses the 
“governance” issue. As it is related to the WTO’s telos of anti-
protectionism, constitutional adjudication is to “enable its members to 
pursue common goals without being defeated by competing antisocial 
conduct of members of the group.”96 In other words, it aims to discipline 
parochial protectionism which undermines the multilateral trading 
system, i.e., legal disciplines over protectionist politics.97 Therefore, the 
purpose of constitutional adjudication goes beyond a mere settling of a 
bilateral trade dispute before the WTO court: it aims to establish a 
general rule which other WTO members than parties concerned will also 
observe in the future. 
 Second, constitutional adjudication concerns the WTO court (the 
AB)’s deliberate departure from the conventional role of a triadic arbiter 
whose main mission is “neutral rule applier.”98 It self-licenses to engage 
in a “creative interpretation” in order to “giv[e] effect to the trade 
regime’s primary purpose.”99 In this regard, Deborah Cass viewed that 
the AB has adopted a unique interpretive technique (“constitutional 
doctrine amalgamation”) which borrows from other constitutional 
domains certain general (interstitial), constitutional principles, such as 
rule of reason or proportionality. 100  Therefore, constitutional 
adjudication eventually associates itself with broader and deeper issues 
(values), such as “how to design a fair system of law.”101  
 Finally, a certain set of developments fashioning the environment 
of the AB’s critical adjudication may help illustrate an institutional self 
of the WTO. Topical controversies and debates over the AB’s 
adjudication offer rich narratives in the WTO which attempt to 
                                                 
96 JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 788 (1969) [hereinafter 
JACKSON, THE LAW OF GATT]. 
97 Dunoff, supra note _ , at 649; JACKSON, THE LAW OF GATT, supra note _ , at 788. See 
also Antonio F. Perez, WTO and U.N. Law: Institutional Comity in National Security, 
23 YALE J. INT’L L. 301, 316-24 (1998) (discussing Professor Jackson’s constitutional 
premise of international trade law). 
98 ALVAREZ, supra note _ , at 492. 
99 Id. 
100 Cass, supra note _ , at 51, 67. 
101 Id., at 52. 
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“constitute,” on their own terms, desirable institutional paradigms re-
configuring the subtle power allocation between the WTO and its 
members. In sum, a proper constellation of interrelated factors, such as 
the AB’s hermeneutical shift, a legislative proposal to codify the shift 
and a counter-proposal to reverse the shift, tends to provide a unique 
constitutional moment within the WTO which facilitates the advent of 
constitutional adjudication. 
Admittedly, the very invocation of “constitution” in the WTO 
context itself may be provoking. 102  After all, the WTO has “no 
constitutional court, no constitutional convention, [and] no 
constitutional drafting process.”103 Nonetheless, any direct, un-nuanced 
domestic analogy derived from the image of the Constitution may be ill-
suited in the WTO context. Despite such social contexts and institutional 
paraphernalia as are different from those of states, the WTO may still 
retain certain “constitutional features” to the extent that governance or 
power allocation between the WTO and its members still matters.104 In 
other words, the WTO’s institutional arrangement different from states 
should not thwart otherwise useful constitutional imaginations within 
the context of the WTO.  
In this regard, constitutional discourse in international trade law 
should involve various dynamic and flexible developments which may 
“proceed along a number of dimensions, and in a number of different 
institutional settings,” rather than “advance[ing] a particular 
constitutional structure or agenda.” 105  This “plasticity” of trade 
constitution enables WTO Members to willingly respond to certain 
constitutional moments with adequate institutional changes.106 In this 
line, one possible dimension of trade constitution, inter alia, which this 
article concerns, may be defined as “a legal and judicial constitution that 
provides rules … for determining supremacy and the scope of judicial 
application of rules.”107 
2. Why Global Constitutional Lawmaking in the WTO?  
On the surface, the AB’s hermeneutical shift in zeroing does not 
appear inevitable. The AB could still have been faithful to the literal 
                                                 
102  Id., at 40 (quoting John H. Jackson, Lecture, John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Boston, Nov. 3, 1999). 
103 Dunoff, supra note _ , at 650. 
104 Trachtman, Constitutions, supra note _ , at 625. Cf. Joseph H. H. Weiler, The Rule 
of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflection on the Internal and External 
Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement, 13 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 177, 189, n.38 (2002) 
(observing that the Appellate Body has a “constitutional” nature or dimension in that it 
interprets a “constituent document”). 
105 Trachtman, Constitutions, supra note _ , at 645 (emphasis added). 
106 Id., at 626, 645 
107 Id., at 624. 
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ambiguities of the Antidumping Agreement as to zeroing and thus 
endorsed it under Article 17.6 (ii) of the Antidumping Agreement in the 
same fashion followed by the 1995 GATT panel. Here, the role of the AB 
would have been an ordinary settler of trade disputes. There would have 
been nothing peculiar here. Furthermore, the hermeneutical shift, as it 
happened, might have been deemed unspectacular as well: it might just 
have been yet another change of interpretation. While it is true that the 
AB employed a teleological interpretation to overcome a possible textual 
interpretation which might have validated zeroing under Article 17.6 
(ii),108 such teleological shift itself does not necessarily deserve the label 
of “constitutional” adjudication. After all, neither all interpretive 
changes nor all teleological interpretations should necessarily be 
constitutional. However, it is not the interpretive shift itself but the 
nature of the shift which should draw our attention in this issue. Both 
the subject-matter (zeroing) and its unique topicality tend to define the 
unique, constitutional quality of the AB’s hermeneutical shift.  
Crucially, one cannot fully capture the significance of AB’s 
hermeneutical turn without taking into account the current 
developments on antidumping measures and implications that zeroing 
exerts in those developments. Since the launch of the WTO in 1995, 
members have thus far initiated about 3,100 antidumping 
investigations,109 while GATT contracting parties conducted only 1,600 
investigations by the 1980’s.110 What is more problematic is that while 
major developed countries, such as the U.S. and the EU, used to be main 
users of antidumping measures in the past, developing countries have 
                                                 
108 Regarding the AB’s refusal of publicly announcing that it conducted teleological 
interpretation, see supra note _. In the same context, the AB refused to acknowledge 
its teleological hermeneutical shift from permitting zeroing to abandoining it. Instead, 
it simply disconnected from the old GATT jurisprudence in this matter based on 
narrow formalistic, textual differences between the Tokyo Round Antidumping Code 
and the current WTO Antidumping Code, and thus eliminated any need to disclose the 
teleological root of its anti-zeroing decision. See United States – Final Antidumping 
Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, WT/DS344/AB/R, Appellate Body Report 
circulated on Apr. 30, 2008, para. 132 (viewing that “the relevance of these panel 
reports [under the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code] is diminished by the fact that 
the plurilateral Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code was legally separate from the GATT 
1947 and has, in any event, been terminated.”). Nonetheless, one could reasonably 
submit that panel reports under the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code constitute the 
GATT acquis. See European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas - Complaint by the United States, WT/DS27/R/USA, Panel 
Report circulated on May 22, 1997, para. 7.26 (upholding a certain practice of panels 
under the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code); Brazil – Measures Affecting Desiccated 
Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, Appellate Body report circulated on Feb. 22, 1997, at 22 
(supporting conclusions expressed by panels under the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping 
Code). 
109 WTO AD Website, supra note _. 
110 Id. 
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recently begun to have recourse to these trade remedies more 
frequently.111 In particular, this proliferation of antidumping measures is 
devastating to poor countries whose economic growth is linked critically 
to access to rich countries’ markets. Even if the currently staggering 
Doha round trade talks were to live up to its sobriquet (“development 
round”) by generously allowing poor countries duty and quota-free 
market access, rich countries could always impose hidden extra tariffs 
on poor countries’ main exports, such as shoes, clothes and catfish, in 
the name of remedying foreign producers’ alleged dumping practice.112 
These antidumping measures tend to effectively neutralize any 
previously enhanced market access borne to poor countries based on 
their comparative advantages.113 At this juncture, it may be worthy of 
reiterating the fact that zeroing facilitates the progress of these 
damaging events by inflating dumping margins up to around 90%.114 
Against this alarming background, the AB has issued a series of 
zeroing decisions. In a total of six decisions since 2001, the AB has thus 
far rendered a very coherent and unwavering line of jurisprudence 
which unequivocally rejects this problematic practice. It is this 
resoluteness which distinguishes the AB’s teleological exegesis from an 
otherwise mere interpretive methodology. Silhouetted against the 
aforementioned topicality of zeroing, the judicial rule-making on zeroing 
was the AB’s purposeful mission of institutionalizing a “proper test”115 
which would shrink the domestic government’s administrative 
discretion to null, and thus render a pro-zeroing interpretation 
“impermissible” under Article 17.6 (ii) in this particular antidumping 
                                                 
111 Id. 
112 See Sungjoon Cho, A Dual Catastrophe of Protectionism, 25 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 
315, 338-41 (2005); Sungjoon Cho, Beyond Doha’s Promises: Administrative Barriers 
as an Obstruction to Development, 25 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. _ (forthcoming 2008). 
113 This developmentally fatal effect of rich countries’ antidumping measures is well 
corroborated by trade statistics. For the last decade, the world’s richest countries’ 
antidumping measures have aimed primarily at low-income developing countries. 
Since the launch of the WTO, the U.S. has initiated a total of 366 antidumping 
investigations, 215 of which have targeted low-income developing countries. WTO AD 
Website, supra note _. The EU follows the U.S. in this regard. During the same period, 
the EU initiated 345 antidumping investigations in total, 237 of which were directed to 
low-income developing countries. Unsurprisingly, most of these antidumping 
initiations have concentrated on primary commodities and labor-intensive 
manufacturing goods on which developing countries hold the main comparative 
advantages vis-à-vis developed countries. If left unchecked, this developmentally fatal 
trend might be enduring as the share of manufacturing products in developing 
countries’ gross exports increases in the future. WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC 
PROSPECTS 2004: REALIZING THE DEVELOPMENT PROMISE OF DOHA AGENDA xx (2003), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRGEP2004/Resources/gep2004fulltext.pdf.  
114 Ikenson, supra note _. 
115 Cf. Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165, 203-04 
(1985). 
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issue (zeroing). In doing so, the AB activated a fundamental normative 
force field which would govern the behaviors of all members, not only 
those who were direct parties of the dispute, in a way which would 
herald a new policy in this field (zeroing). It is fundamental in the sense 
that zeroing undermines the very telos of the WTO (free trade) and 
defies the very identity of the WTO as a trade organization.  
This constitutional adjudication is inextricably linked to a string 
of developments which in combination may signify a certain 
“constitutional moment” in the WTO. What the AB struck down in its 
first zeroing decision (EC – Bed Linen) in 2001 concerned only a specific 
type of zeroing (zeroing in a weighted-average-to-weighted-average 
comparison). However, a large group of WTO members, consisting of 
Brazil; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Hong Kong, China; Israel; Japan; 
Korea; Mexico; Norway; the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, 
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu; Singapore, Switzerland and Thailand 
which are collectively coined “Friends of Antidumping,” seized this 
moment to propose for the prohibition of zeroing in all kinds of 
comparison methodologies in June 2003. 116  The Friends of 
Antidumping proposal was vindicated by the AB’s subsequent across-
the-board invalidation of zeroing. 117  However, the U.S., the sole 
defendant which lost all zeroing cases, proposed to reinstate the zeroing 
practice via amendment.118 On November 30, 2007, the Chair of the 
Negotiating Group on Rules circulated the “Drafted Consolidated Chair 
Texts of the AD and SCM Agreements,” which attempted to compromise 
between the AB jurisprudence and the U.S. proposal, but dissatisfied 
both sides.119 In sum, those tensions and controversies engendered by 
                                                 
116 Proposal on Prohibition of Zeroing, Paper from Brazil;  Chile; Columbia;  Costa 
Rica; Hong Kong, China; Israel; Japan; Korea; Mexico; Norway; the Separate Customs 
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu; Singapore; Switzerland and Thailand, 
TN/RL/W/113, Jun. 6, 2003. (“Amend Article 2.4.2 to explicitly provide that 
regardless of the basis of the comparison of export prices to normal value (i.e. weighted 
average-to-weighted average or transaction-to-transaction, or weighted average-to-
transaction), all positive margins of dumping and negative margins of dumping found 
on imports from an exporter or producer of the product subject to investigation or 
review must be added up.”) [The Anti-Zeroing Proposal]. 
117 See supra pt. II, § C.  
118 The U.S. May 2006 Communication, supra note _; Proposal on Offsets for Non-
Dumped Comparisons, TN/RL/GEN/147, Jun. 27, 2007 [hereinafter The June 2007 
Proposal]. 
119 WTO, Negotiating Group on Rules, Draft Consolidated Chair Texts of the AD and 
SCM Agreements, TN/RL/W/213, Nov. 30, 2007 [hereinafter WTO AD Draft]. 
Regarding reactions to the Draft Texts, see the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative, Joint Statement by the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative and the Department of Commerce’s International Trade 
Administration, Nov. 30, 2007 (stating that the U.S. was “very disappointed with 
important aspects of this draft text”); Statement on “Zeroing” in the Anti-Dumping 
Negotiations, Statement of Brazil;  Chile;  China;  Colombia;  Costa Rica;  Hong Kong, 
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the AB’s zeroing decisions are testimonial to a constitutional moment, as 
far as zeroing is concerned, in that they, together with the AB’s 
constitutional adjudication, tend to shape the contour of an institutional 
identity of the WTO as an international organization which upholds free 
trade. 
In sum, the AB has thrown to us, and answered itself behind the 
recent train of anti-zeroing decisions, a “constitutional” question, i.e., 
how we should understand and construct the WTO in the face of 
members’ policy options which could potentially compromise the very 
goal of the organization. Here, the AB chose a different interpretive path 
from the old GATT panel, thereby breathing a new life into the same old 
texts, such as “a fair comparison between the export price and the 
domestic price” (Article 2.4 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement and 
Article 2 of the Tokyo Round Antidumping Code) and “the amount of 
the anti-dumping duty must not exceed the margin of dumping” (Article 
9.3 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement and Article 8 of the Tokyo 
Round Antidumping Code). This critical choice was based on the AB’s 
firm consciousness of immediate and powerful normative consequences 
which its adjudication would engender to the future of the WTO. To wit, 
the AB was well aware that its adjudication would “constitute” the WTO, 
at least as far as this particular issue (zeroing) is concerned. This is why 
the nature of the AB’s hermeneutical shift on zeroing might be coined 
constitutional. 
One important caveat is in order. Constitutional adjudication 
which this article theorizes in this article is entirely subject matter-
specific: it is exclusively regarding the zeroing practice. Therefore, 
constitutional adjudication addressed here should not be unduly 
generalized and expanded to other WTO issues. Importantly, 
constitutional adjudication on zeroing does not fossilize in general 
Article 17.6 (ii), which may still provide ample deference to domestic 
antidumping authorities on other antidumping issues. Moreover, 
constitutional adjudication might not make sense in non-antidumping 
contexts, and even if it does, it could feature quite different patterns 
from what is described here. For example, if the AB were to adjudicate 
another important regulatory issue of reconciling trade value and non-
trade value (legitimate policy objectives), such as the protection of 
public health and the environment, its judicial rule-making in these 
                                                                                                                                 
China;  India;  Indonesia;  Israel;  Japan;  Korea, Rep. of;  Mexico;  Norway;  Pakistan;  
Singapore;  South Africa;  Switzerland; Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, 
Kinmen and Matsu;  Thailand;  and Viet Nam, TN/RL/W/214/Rev.3, Jan. 25, 2008 
(emphasizing that zeroing as a “biased” method for calculating dumping margins risks 
“nullify[ing] the results of trade liberalization efforts.”) [hereinafter The Anti-Zeroing 
Statement]. 
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areas would demonstrate different types of constitutional 
adjudication.120 
B. Normative Ramifications of Global Constitutional 
Lawmaking  
1. Could WTO Members Overturn Constitutional Lawmaking?  
 After losing a series of zeroing cases under the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism, the U.S. proposed that zeroing be ultimately 
resolved through negotiations, instead of being left to adjudication.121 
Naturally, the U.S. suggested that relevant provisions of the 
Antidumping Agreement, such as Articles 2.4 and 9.3, be amended in a 
way which explicitly endorses zeroing.122 The U.S.’ drive for negotiation 
prompted the Chair of the Negotiating Group on Rules, the Uruguayan 
Ambassador Guillermo Valles Games, to circulate on November 30, 
2007 the “Drafted Consolidated Chair Texts of the AD and SCM 
Agreements” which “[he] believe[d] could facilitate the negotiation of a 
balanced outcome.”123  
 The Chair’s draft text on zeroing appears to be a compromise 
between the current WTO case law and the U.S. proposal. While the text 
prohibits zeroing in “multiple comparisons of a weighted average 
normal value with a weighted average of prices of all comparable export 
transactions,” it permits zeroing “on a transaction-to-transaction basis 
or of multiple comparisons of individual export transactions to a 
weighted average normal value” as well as in case of administrative 
reviews.124 A large group of countries opposing zeroing criticized the text. 
They emphasized that zeroing as a “biased” method for calculating 
dumping margins risks “nullify[ing] the results of trade liberalization 
efforts.”125 The Chair subsequently conceded that there simply existed 
“no hints on possible middle ground approaches nor suggestions for 
possible compromises or trade-offs.”126 
                                                 
120 See generally SUNGJOON CHO, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL REGULATION: A REFORM 
AGENDA OF THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM (2003). 
121 The U.S. June 2007 Communication, supra note _.  
122 The U.S. proposed to add the following paragraph: “Authorities are not required to 
offset the results of any comparison in which the export price is greater than the 
normal value against the results of any comparison in which the normal value is 
greater than the export price.” The U.S. May 2006 Communication, supra note _; The 
U.S. June 2007 Proposal, supra note _.  
123 WTO AD Draft, supra note _. 
124 Id. 
125 The Anti-Zeroing Statement, supra note _. 
126 WTO, Negotiating Group on Rules, Working Document from the Chairman, 
TN/RL/W/232, May 28, 2008, at 1, A-10, A-11. 
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Considering these diametrically opposite views on zeroing among 
major WTO members as well as the inchoate stage of WTO negotiations 
in this controversial issue, any pro-zeroing amendment of the 
Antidumping Agreement is highly unlikely, at least in the near future.127 
Nonetheless, if such amendment should ever transpire, would it trump 
the outcome of the AB’s constitutional adjudication (constitutional 
jurisprudence)?  
Purely from a normative standpoint, one might argue that it 
should not. According to this position, since constitutional 
jurisprudence on zeroing directly addresses the most essential value 
(telos) of the WTO system, such as anti-protectionism, even an 
amendment of WTO norms should not repeal this fundamental norm.128 
This preemptive, per se invalid position tends to distinguish 
constitutional jurisprudence from other WTO case laws concerning 
more mundane trade disputes whose outcome may be altered by 
subsequent negotiations.  
However, this position appears not only infeasible but also 
illogical. The existence of one constitutional norm (anti-zeroing 
jurisprudence) should not unduly block any future constitutional 
dynamics under the WTO. One might logically envision a situation in 
which WTO members might need to modify, if not repeal, even this 
jurisprudence via a constitutional amendment, such as a revision of the 
WTO Charter and/or the WTO Antidumping Agreement.  
Nevertheless, WTO members must not entertain any lax 
overriding of such paramount constitutional jurisprudence, for example 
repealing the constitutional jurisprudence through a soft norm, such as 
a decision or a declaration by Ministers129 simply as a result mundane 
bargaining in the trade negotiation, as is currently conducted in 
Negotiating Group on Rules. 130  This lower threshold in nullifying 
constitutional norms risks over-politicizing the WTO’s normative 
operation in this important area.131 In this sense, the legal status of anti-
                                                 
127 See Jonathan Lynn, Anti-Dumping Row Roils WTO, Isolates U.S., REUTERS, Jan. 10, 
2008 (quoting Brendan McGivern who observed that “it’s wildly optimistic of the U.S. 
to think they’ll get this back through negotiations”).  
128 See The Anti-Zeroing Statement, supra note _. 
129 See Mary E. Footer, The Role of 'Soft' Law Norms in Reconciling the Antinomies of 
WTO Law (July 14, 2008), Society of International Economic Law (SIEL) Inaugural 
Conference 2008 Paper, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1159929, at 12-
13 (observing that soft norms, such as a “decision,” are subject to a hardening process, 
such as an “amendment”). According to Footer, it is conceivable that a decision 
remains unamended. Id. 
130 Currently, most WTO members approach this issue not even through “negotiation” 
but rather merely as “discussion.” WTO: 2008 News Items, Lamy Urges “Maximum 
Effort” for July Meeting of Ministers, Jun. 27, 2008. 
131 Cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan, What’s Wrong with Constitutional Amendments, in GREAT 
AND EXTRAORDINARY OCCASIONS: DEVELOPING GUIDELINES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
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zeroing jurisprudence might be analogous to a strong version of the U.S. 
“constitutional common law,” which survives an ordinary legislative 
challenge yet is still subject to a subsequent constitutional 
amendment. 132  In other words, procedural rigors built in Article X 
(Amendment) of the WTO Agreement, including a super majority 
rule,133 must govern any modification of the zeroing jurisprudence. A 
simple decision or declaration engineered by a negotiation must not 
immediately overturn it without a formal amendment.  
On the contrary, under an ideal scenario WTO members should 
“codify” the outcome of constitutional adjudication, i.e., the AB’s anti-
zeroing case law.134 
2. Could a Lower Tribunal (Panel) Reject Constitutional Lawmaking?  
Despite the well-established anti-zeroing jurisprudence, a recent 
panel in U.S. - Zeroing (Mexico) explicitly rejected the AB’s positions, in 
particular those in U.S. – Zeroing (EC) and U.S. – Zeroing (Japan), and 
instead followed the same line of reasoning which two previous panels 
had employed in these cases.135 These cases concerned, inter alia, a 
                                                                                                                                 
39 (1999) (warning that frequent constitutional amendments might be used as “a chip 
in short-run political games”).  
132 A strong version of constitutional common law, which I analogize here, refers to 
certain constitutional rules which are “elaborated by judges through precedent-based 
reasoning” and “not defeasible by ordinary legislation.” See generally David A. Strauss, 
Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996). See also 
Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Amendments and the Constitutional Common Law, 
CHICAGO PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER No. 73, at 1, n.2. In contrast, a 
soft version of constitutional common law envisions being overturned by legislation. 
See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term – Forward: 
Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975).  
133 WTO Agreement, supra note _ , art. X, paras. 1 and 3 (“Amendments to provisions 
of this Agreement, or of the Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annexes 1A and 1C, 
other than those listed in paragraphs 2 and 6, of a nature that would alter the rights 
and obligations of the Members, shall take effect for the Members that have accepted 
them upon acceptance by two thirds of the Members and thereafter for each other 
Member upon acceptance by it.”). 
134 A group of countries, such as Brazil; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Hong Kong, 
China; Israel; Japan; Korea; Mexico; Norway; the Separate Customs Territory of 
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu; Singapore, Switzerland and Thailand, which are 
collectively called the “Friends of Antidumping” proposed for the prohibition of 
zeroing in all kinds of comparison methodologies in June 2003. They proposed to 
“amend Article 2.4.2 to explicitly provide that regardless of the basis of the comparison 
of export prices to normal value (i.e. weighted average-to-weighted average or 
transaction-to-transaction, or weighted average-to-transaction), all positive margins of 
dumping and negative margins of dumping found on imports from an exporter or 
producer of the product subject to investigation or review must be added up.” The 
Anti-Zeroing Proposal, supra note _. 
135 United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, 
Report of the Panel, WT/DS344/R, Dec. 20, 2007, para. 7.106 (“[W]e have decided 
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“simple zeroing” in the administrative (periodic) review.136 Although the 
U.S. - Zeroing (Mexico) panel admitted that the AB “de facto expects” 
the panel to respect adopted AB reports “to the extent that the legal 
issues are similar,” 137  it emphasized that panels “are not, strictly 
speaking, bound by previous Appellate Body or panel decisions that 
have addressed the same issue.”138 However, the panel’s stance here is 
unacceptable for the following reasons as long as one envisions the 
notion of constitutional adjudication in this matter. 
First of all, the panel exaggerated the technical deficiency of legal 
bindingness of AB decisions. No matter how one may label the WTO 
jurisprudence, it has never been the label itself which has actually 
bestowed compliance pull upon those decisions.139 Regardless of the 
label, members perceive these precedents as well-established 
“jurisprudence” which they voluntarily observe: they cite, quote and 
reference the AB’s precedents to substantiate and reinforce their own 
legal positions in the dispute. While not all members abide by the WTO 
jurisprudence all the time, such breaches do not necessarily nullify the 
legal authority of the jurisprudence. In particular, if such jurisprudence 
concerns constitutional issues, such as zeroing, its compliance pull tends 
to be stronger than other situations as members fully appreciate the 
normative weight of such jurisprudence. Perhaps this heightened 
compliance pull can explain the EC’s swift change of course the moment 
the AB struck down its own zeroing practice in 2001.140 
Second, as discussed above, constitutional adjudication on 
zeroing normatively prevails even over members’ attempt to modify its 
outcome through political bargaining (amendment). If constitutional 
adjudication should govern members’ behaviors, it should also regulate 
panels’ rulings. Otherwise, the normative superiority flowing from 
constitutional adjudication would be meaningless.  
Third, the U.S. - Zeroing (Mexico) panel rationalized its defiance 
by invoking DSU Article 19.2 which prohibits both the panel and the AB 
from “adding to or diminishing” WTO members’ rights and 
obligations.141 In other words, the panel implied that the AB diminished 
                                                                                                                                 
that we have no option but to respectfully disagree with the line of reasoning developed 
by the Appellate Body regarding the WTO-consistency of simple zeroing in periodic 
reviews.”) [hereinafter U.S. – Zeroing (Mexico)]. 
136 Id., paras. 7.106, 7.115.  
137 Id., para. 7.105. 
138 Id., para. 7.102. 
139 Cf. Gélinas, supra note _ , at 493 (observing that the precedent effect in the WTO 
does not originate strictly from the “stare decisis” but rather from a concern for 
“formal justice” which is interested in preserving the “security and predictability” of 
the multilateral trading system). 
140 See supra pt. II, § C. 
141 U.S. – Zeroing (Mexico), supra note _ , para. 7.102. 
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the U.S.’ rights under the WTO norms by judicially enacting a new 
proscription on zeroing. However, the very idea of constitutional 
adjudication tends to prevent the panel from making such self-assured 
determination. Especially because it regards a “constitutional” issue, a 
WTO panel, as a lower tribunal, is not entitled to question the validity of 
the decision rendered by the AB as a constitutional tribunal. Moreover, 
the panel’s justification for departing from the AB’s constitutional 
jurisprudence is itself groundless: the AB’s constitutional adjudication 
never diminishes members’ WTO rights and obligations: it simply 
“clarifies” them from the standpoint of trade constitution. 
 Sharing the same position, the AB in U.S. – Zeroing (Mexico) 
rightly rejected the panel’s position in this issue. It emphasized that the 
fact that AB reports may not be “binding” per se does not free panels 
from observing previous reports. 142  The AB reiterated its previous 
findings that adopted AB reports create “legitimate expectations” among 
WTO members and that panels’ observance with those reports would 
also be expected. 143  The AB justified its position with a critical 
observation on the value of “jurisprudence” within the WTO, which is 
arguably the most important dicta in this question. 
160. (…) Adopted panel and Appellate Body reports are often 
cited by parties in support of legal arguments in dispute 
settlement proceedings, and are relied upon by panels and the 
Appellate Body in subsequent disputes.  In addition, when 
enacting or modifying laws and national regulations pertaining to 
international trade matters, WTO Members take into account the 
legal interpretation of the covered agreements developed in 
adopted panel and Appellate Body reports. (…)144 
 The AB did not forget to admonish the panel’s unusual behavior. 
With a solemn tone, it emphasized that the panel’s defiance is against 
the hierarchical division of labor in DSU under which only the AB can 
“uphold, modify or reverse” panels’ legal interpretations. 145  The AB 
expressed its deep concern over the panel’s rebellious behavior.146 
 In the most recent zeroing dispute (U.S. – Continued Zeroing), 
the panel did follow the AB’s well-established anti-zeroing jurisprudence 
unlike previous panels, which had defied the AB. Yet the panel did so 
only reluctantly. The panel still viewed those decisions by defiant panels 
as “persuasive,”147 although it eventually struck down the U.S.’ zeroing 
                                                 
142 AB Report, U.S. – Zeroing (Mexico), supra note _ , para. 158. 
143 Id., para. 159 
144 Id., para. 160. 
145 Id., para. 161. 
146 Id., para. 162. 
147 United States – Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology, 
WT/DS350/R, Panel Report circulated on Oct. 1, 2oo8, para. 7.169. 
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practices for the sake of the WTO jurisprudence.148 In response, a rare 
Concurring Opinion eventually tolled the death knell on zeroing by 
declaring that: 
312. (…) In matters of adjudication, there must be an end to every 
great debate.  The Appellate Body exists to clarify the meaning of 
the covered agreements.  On the question of zeroing it has spoken 
definitively. Its decisions have been adopted by the DSB.  The 
membership of the WTO is entitled to rely upon these outcomes.  
(…) At a point in every debate, there comes a time when it is more 
important for the system of dispute resolution to have a definitive 
outcome, than further to pick over the entrails of battles past.  
With respect to zeroing, that time has come.149 
 
III. Resistance to Global Constitutional Lawmaking  
A. Challenges to Constitutional Adjudication on Zeroing  
The bold jurisprudence which the AB has crafted in striking down 
zeroing has invited a good deal of criticisms from various fronts. Some 
contend that nowhere in the WTO and its Antidumping Agreement texts 
as well as their legislative history (Uruguay Round negotiation history) 
does an explicit prohibition of this practice exist. According to them, 
therefore, the AB is “making up rules that the U.S. never negotiated.”150 
In this line, the U.S. government has observed that: 
A prohibition of zeroing, or a requirement to provide offsets for 
non-dumped transactions, simply cannot be found in the text of 
the AD [Antidumping] Agreement.  (…) The issue of zeroing, on 
which Members could not reach agreement in the Uruguay 
Round, should not be left to dispute settlement. We as Members 
should endeavour to reach an agreement on this issue through 
negotiation.151 
In fact, Article 17.6 (ii) of the Antidumping Agreement provides 
that in times of ambiguities (when a provision “admits of more than one 
permissible interpretation”) a WTO panel shall validate a domestic 
antidumping authority’s measure “if it rests upon one of those 
permissible interpretations.”152 In the presence of this Article, the AB’s 
invalidation of zeroing which is not prohibited under GATT Article VI 
and the Antidumping Agreement might be seen to amount to “legislating 
                                                 
148 Id., para. 7.182. 
149 AB Report, U.S. – Continued Zeroing, supra note _ , para. 312. 
150 See supra note _. 
151 Communication from the United States, Offsets for Non-Dumped Comparisons, 
TN/RL/W/208, Jun. 5, 2007, at 2 [The U.S. June 2007 Communication]. 
152 AD Agreement, supra note _, art. 17.6 (ii). 
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to fill in the perceived gaps in the coverage of the Antidumping 
Agreement” and thus violates the “standard of review contained in the 
Antidumping Agreement that calls for deference to national 
administrators of antidumping laws.”153  
These discontents on the AB’s judicial activism may be 
encapsulated as “judicial legislation.” 154 Judicial legislation exercised by 
an overzealous trade tribunal would encroach upon member states’ 
regulatory autonomy in certain policy matters which they believe has 
never been ceded to international organizations like the WTO. The way 
in which the DSU is written might attest to this position. Under the DSU, 
the formal mission of the WTO tribunal is merely to “assist” the Dispute 
Settlement Body (i.e., the General Council) to “settle” disputes between 
WTO members by delivering mere “recommendations.”155 As frequently 
cited, these recommendations are not permitted to add to or diminish 
the rights and obligations of member states.156  
Often, criticisms against the AB’s judicial activism become rather 
emotional. Understandably, they originate from certain domestic 
producers who compete with foreign rivals. They contend that 
““zeroing” is one of the sinews of U.S. antidumping law. Abandonment 
of “zeroing” would not be, as some have suggested, a methodological 
tweak of Commerce’s dumping methodology or a minor concession by 
the United States to mollify the WTO.”157 
The U.S. Congress has been quite responsive to these anxious 
voices. In a recent statute renewing the president’s trade promotion 
authority (TPA, formerly known as the fast track authority), it explicitly 
demonstrated its frustration over the AB’s interpretation of Article 17.6 
(ii) of the WTO Antidumping Agreement in a way which has allegedly 
deprived the U.S. regulatory agency (the DOC) of its rightful deference 
                                                 
153 Alan Wm. Wolff, Problems with WTO Dispute Settlement, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 417, 421 
(2001). See also Alford, supra note _, at 199-202; Greenwald, supra note _, at 114. 
154 Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discrusive, Constitutional, 
and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 247-48 (2004) (observing that a wide 
range of commentators, such as scholars, practitioners, politicians and NGOs, have 
recently accused the WTO Appellate Body of judicial activism). 
155 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
Annex 2, WTO Agreement, supra note _, art.19.1 [hereinafter DSU].  
156 Id., arts. 3.2, 19.2. See Communication from the United States, United States – Laws, 
Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins (“Zeroing”), 
WT/DS294/16, May 17, 2006, para. 29 (“The perception that the dispute settlement 
system is operating so as to add to or diminish rights and obligations actually agreed to 
by Members, notwithstanding DSU Articles 3.2 and 19.2, is highly corrosive to the 
credibility that the dispute settlement system has accumulated over the past 11 years.”) 
[hereinafter The U.S. May 2006 Communication]. 
157 House Committee Ways and Means, Joint Statement of Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade 
Action Committee and Southern Shrimp Alliance, available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=5468.  
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secured under the Article. §2101 (b) (3) (B) of the 2001 TPA Bill 
provides that “[t]he Congress is concerned that dispute settlement 
panels of the WTO and the Appellate Body appropriately apply the 
standard of review contained in Article 17.6 of the Antidumping 
Agreement, to provide deference to a permissible interpretation by a 
WTO member of provisions of that Agreement, …”158 In a similar context, 
a group of ten U.S. senators sent a letter to the USTR and the DOC in 
December 2006 anxiously warning that eliminating zeroing would lead 
to a “dramatic weakening” of the U.S. antidumping laws.159 
Facing these protests from the Congress, some commentators 
warn that the AB’s disregard of the special standard of review might 
deter the U.S.’ generous trade concessions in the subsequent round of 
trade negotiations. 160  According to them, the AB’s judicial activism 
might end up with a Pyrrhic victory to free tradists.161 
B. Defending Constitutional Adjudication on Zeroing 
1. The Augmented Role of International Adjudication 
Despite the criticism of “judicial usurpation,” 162  it is widely 
recognized that judges, both international and domestic, do more than 
merely apply rules in the book in a mechanical fashion. To some extent, 
judicial legislation is an innate, unavoidable function of adjudication.163 
To deny this preposition would be close to sticking to a myth.164 As early 
as over a century ago, Ezra Thayer emphasized that the “growth of law” 
via judicial legislation is not only “desirable” but also “necessary.”165 Two 
decades later, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously ruled that when 
                                                 
158 Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933(2002), § 2101(b)(3)(B).  
159 Rossella Brevetti, U.S. Zeroing Methodology Hit Again by WTO Appellate Body, 24 
INT’L TRADE REP. 53, Jan. 11, 2007. 
160 Daniel K. Tarullo, Paved with Good Intentions: The Dynamic Effects of WTO 
Review of Anti-Dumping Action, 2 WORLD TRADE REV. 373, 374 (2003); Steinberg, 
supra note _, at 261. But see United States General Accounting Office (GAO), World 
Trade Organization: Standard of Review and Impact of Trade Remedy Rulings, July 
2003 (observing that “of the legal experts GAO consulted, a majority concluded that 
the WTO has properly applied standards of review and correctly ruled on major trade 
remedy issues.”). 
161 Tarullo, supra note _, at 374. 
162 Ezra R. Thayer, Judicial Legislation: Its Legitimate Function in the Development of 
the Common Law, 5 HARV. L. REV. 172, (1892). 
163 See Thomas M. Franck, Some Psychological Factors in International Third-Party 
Decision-Making, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1217, 1221 (1967). See also Fabien Gélinas, Dispute 
Settlement as Institutionalization in International Trade and Information 
Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 490 (2005) (observing a general trend of 
judicial legislation in the post-war era) (citing Ran Hirschl, Toward Juristocracy: The 
Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism 1 (2004)). 
164 JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 521 (2005). 
165 Thayer, supra note _, at _. 
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we interpret “constituent act[s]” such as the Constitution, we must be 
aware that “they have called into life a being the development of which 
could not have been foreseen completely be the most gifted of its 
begetters.”166 More recently, Martin Shapiro observed that it would be 
“logically required” that any judicial discovery involves judicial law-
making since no pre-existing norm completely covers future cases.167 
After all, any norms, if left unchanged, tend to become outmoded, and 
even anachronistic, as it fails to respond to altered realities with the 
passage of time.  
The necessity of judicial progressive development (updating) of 
fixated text is no less acute in the international law arena than in the 
domestic legal system. In fact, the need for judicial gap-filling may be 
stronger in the international law setting considering that deliberated 
ambiguities in the text are often a necessary evil for unyielding state 
parties to reach any compromise. These textual ambiguities unavoidably 
widen a gap between the black letter law (past) and the cases at hand 
(present). Thus, it becomes a vital mission of any (well-functioning) 
international tribunal to “seek consistency that connects past, present, 
and future.” 168  This is the very reason why international judges, in 
interpreting treaty texts, “must have regard to the exigencies of 
contemporary life, rather than to the intentions of those who framed 
it.”169 In this sense, international adjudication, more than domestic one, 
engages in a “dynamic” process of judicial rule-making, which produces 
jurisprudence or case law.170 The WTO tribunal is not an exception to 
this trend.171 
                                                 
166 Missouri v. Holland, 253 U.S. 416 (1920), at 433-4. 
167 MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 29 (1981). 
168 THOMAS FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 335 (1995).  
169 Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the UN, 1950 
ICJ Rep. 4, at 17-18 (quoted in ALVAREZ, supra note _, at 96). 
170 See Alec Stone Sweet, The New GATT: Dispute Resolution and the Judicialization 
of the Trade Regime in LAW ABOVE NATIONS: SUPRANATIONAL COURTS AND THE 
LEGALIZATION OF POLITICS 139 (Mary L. Volcansek ed., 1997). Cf. David A. Strauss, 
Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 877, 884 (1996) 
(discussing the “prevalence and importance of non-textual amendments”); HERSCH 
LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 
155-266 (1982) (addressing “judicial legislation”); EDWARD MCWHINNEY, SUPREME 
COURTS AND JUDICIAL LAW-MAKING: CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNALS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVIEW 168 (1988) (discussing the “imperative principles” of a novel jus gentium); 
RENE DAVID, ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3 (1985) (arguing that 
“independent judges” in international trade tribunals can develop a jus gentium free 
from the contingencies of the various States). See also Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to 
Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REV. 899, 937 (2005) (recognizing the 
inevitability of gap-filling and certain “minimal lawmaking” by independent 
international tribunals). Cf. Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International 
Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492, 1500 (2004) (observing many scholars’ view 
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The WTO’s unique institutional structure may further warrant 
the case of judicial rule-making. The WTO suffers, like many other 
international treaties, basic “positivist” predicaments stemming from 
often stubborn and eccentric “wills” of state. The difficulty of converging 
more than 150 wills tends to make any legislation under the WTO 
extremely painful and thus impracticable. Legislation in the WTO is also 
compounded by the daunting decision-making mechanism, which is 
either consensus or supermajority in any important matter.172 Under 
these taxing circumstances, the WTO jurisprudence developed by the 
WTO panels and the AB should be given more weight in terms of the 
WTO’s nuanced institutional balance than in terms of the Montesquiean 
notion of separation of powers that are better suited to the domestic 
context. 173  After all, this is a useful manifestation of “judicial 
prudentialism,”174 rather than as reckless judicial activism. 
                                                                                                                                 
that the “power of international institutions to interpret their founding instruments is 
a significant source of authority for generating new rules”). 
171 See Raj Bhala, The Myth about Stare Decisis and International Trade Law (Part 
One of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 845, 848-49 (1999) (recognizing the WTO 
tribunal’s rule-making role). Joel Trachtman espouses the case of judicial rule-making 
in the WTO dispute settlement system as he employs an economic approach of 
“incomplete contract” and “rules/standards distinction.” Trachtman, The WTO’s 
Domain, supra note _, at 350-55; Gillian K. Hadfield, Weighing the Value of 
Vagueness: An Economic Perspective on Precision in the Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 541, 547 
(1994). Trachtman views that the WTO tribunal is “not simply a mechanism for neutral 
application of legislated rules but is itself a mechanism of legislation and of 
governance.” Trachtman, The WTO’s Domain, supra note _, at 336. In a similar 
context, Kenneth Abbott views “legalization” as “delegation” which means that third 
parties are authorized to interpret and apply those rules as well as resolve disputes. 
Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, in LEGALIZATION AND WORLD 
POLITICS 17 (Judith L. Goldstein et al. eds., 2001). After all, it may be optimal if an 
originally incomplete contract, such as the WTO treaty, which contains not only 
definite rules but also more open-ended standards, may be filled in later by a judicial 
organ. 
172 See notably John H. Jackson, Appraising the Launch and Functioning of the WTO, 
39 GERMAN Y. B. INT’L L. 20, 39 (1996) (viewing that “the decision-making and voting 
procedures of the WTO, although much improved over the GATT, still leave much to be 
desired. It is not clear how the consensus practice will proceed, particularly given the 
large number of countries now or soon involved.”).  
173 See Donald M. McRae, The WTO in International Law: Traditional Continued or 
New Frontier?, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 27, 40 (2000) (arguing that the WTO dispute 
settlement system fosters the “development of principles of international law through 
judicial decisions at a much faster pace than has occurred under existing international 
legal institutions”). See Philippe Sands, ‘Unilateralism,’ Values, and International 
Law, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 291, 301 (2000) (advocating the Appellate Body’s “enhanced 
role for a self-confident judiciary, filling in the gaps which states in their legislative 
capacity have been unwilling – or unable – to fill”); Steinberg, supra note _, at 260. Cf. 
Shimon Shetreet, Judging in Society: The Changing Role of Courts, in THE ROLE OF 
COURTS IN SOCIETY 469 (Shimon Shetreet ed., 1988) (observing that “legislatures are 
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Predictably, critics of the AB would emphasize the textual 
semblance of Article 17.6 (ii) to the Chevron doctrine, and argue that the 
Article is a specific “rule” which must be directly applied, not 
constructed, by the WTO tribunal in the same manner in which the 
Chevron doctrine is applied in the U.S. court. 175  However, if one 
categorizes the Article as a more flexible “standard,” the WTO tribunal 
can certainly fill in the gap of an incomplete treaty, i.e., the WTO 
Antidumping Agreement. In fact, considering the murky nature of 
negotiation history under the Uruguay Round over the antidumping 
issues in general,176 it would be only logical to construe the Article as a 
standard whose real life applications have been delegated to the WTO 
tribunal.177 According to the game theory, this interpretive flexibility is 
to enhance “allocative efficiency.”178 One could reasonably speculate that 
the Antidumping Agreement would not have come to light if disagreeing 
negotiators had stubbornly clung to their own original preferences, 
which had been diametrically opposite. 
Despite its strong merits, judicial rule-making by the WTO 
tribunal manifests itself in a much nuanced fashion. As José Alvarez 
observed, “candid acknowledgment of judicial law-making … is a rarity 
in international decisions.”179 In fact, Judge Jennings, one of the most 
respected ICJ judges, once wrote that “the most important requirement 
of the judicial function” appears to be applying preexisting norms even 
when it “creates law in the sense of developing, adapting, modifying, 
filling gaps, interpreting, or even branching out in a new direction.”180 
The WTO tribunal, like any other international tribunal, is rather 
reserved and circumspect in performing this inevitable judicial 
function.181 This low-key stance results from the fact that the AB is all 
                                                                                                                                 
generally slow to introduce law reforms to ensure that the law adapts to changing times 
and changing social and moral norms”). 
174 Cf. Russell Gabriel & Louis B. Sohn, Equity in International Law, 82 AM. SOC'Y INT'L 
L. PROC. 277, 283-84 (1988). 
175 Regarding the distinction between “rules” and “standards,” see Trachtman, The 
WTO’s Domain, supra note _, at 335. 
176 See supra note _. 
177 Trachtman, The WTO’s Domain, supra note _, at 352. 
178 Id. 
179 ALVAREZ, supra note _, at 532.  
180 MOHAMMED SHAHABUDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT 232 (1996); ALVAREZ, 
supra note _, at 532, n. 38; Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, Multiple International 
Judicial Forums: A Reflection of the Growing Strength of International Law or Its 
Fragmentation, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 929, 945 (2004) (viewing that “judicial legislation 
at the international level is a well recognized occurrence, albeit within limits of judicial 
caution and restraint”). 
181 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to Promote the International Rule of Law?: 
Contributions by the World Trade Organization Appellate Review System, 1 J. INT'L 
ECON. L. 25 (1998). 
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too well aware of members’ anxieties over its potential judicial activism 
and the subsequent encroachment on their sovereignty. Therefore, the 
AB always endeavors to avoid any implications which may lead some 
members to suspect that it overreaches its textually limited mandate 
under DSU, i.e., not adding to or diminishing members’ rights and 
obligations. The AB’s well-documented preoccupation with textual 
interpretation, even when it in facts adopts teleological interpretation, 
attests to this caution.182 
2. The Ambiguous Nature of WTO Bargain 
As discussed above, critics of the AB seem to subscribe to a 
contractarian view on the multilateral trading system. They basically 
view that invalidating zeroing is not what members, especially those 
members which advocate zeroing, had bargained for in the Uruguay 
Round negotiations. 183  On the contrary, the real deal struck in the 
Uruguay Round, according to them, was to bestow considerable 
deference to domestic antidumping authorities, which is allegedly 
enshrined in Article 17.6 (ii) of the WTO Antidumping Agreement. 
Those critics appear to deem this Article as a sacrosanct term of the 
Uruguay Round contract. As a matter of fact, the Article was inserted at 
the eleventh hour in the Uruguay Round negotiation at the U.S.’ strong 
behest. No doubt, the U.S. did not want the newly created, and more 
judicialized, WTO dispute settlement mechanism to restrain the 
operation of its politically sensitive domestic antidumping regime, 
which is a critical protectionist bulwark serving politically powerful 
domestic producers. To them, Article 17.6 (ii) would be a Trojan horse 
deliberately deployed in the middle of the multilateral trading system.  
However, a contractarian understanding of the WTO may 
overstate a positivist/realist nature of the multilateral trading system 
and thus fails to fully capture its true aspects at the risk of committing 
                                                                                                                                 
See also Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Constitutional Conceits: The WTO’s ‘Constitution’ and the 
Discipline of International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 647, 658 (2006) (observing that 
“there can be little doubt that the AB's larger, if implicit, message -- that it will not 
adopt or articulate a 'constitutional' understanding of the WTO's institutional 
architecture -- was widely understood.”). 
182 See notably Henrik Horn and Joseph H.H. Weiler, European Communities – Trade 
Description of Sardines: Textualism and its Discontent, in THE WTO CASE LAW OF 
2002 262 (H. Horn and P.C. Mavroidis eds. 2005). See also Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, 
Six Years on the Bench of the “World Trade Court”: Some Personal Experiences as 
Member of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 
605, 617 (2002) (observing that the AB emphasized the textual interpretation so as to 
avoid criticism that it has modified WTO members’ rights and obligations in the WTO 
treaty).  
183 See supra note _. But cf. Submission by Japan, _ (observing that there existed no 
consensus on zeroing at the time of Uruguay Round negotiations).  
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anachronism. Concededly, the prototypical construct of the post-war 
global trading system was a sovereign contract dealing mostly with 
tariffs, i.e., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The agreement was 
negotiated, signed and implemented by “contacting” parties. Under this 
originally positivist structure, both the formation and the operation of 
GATT would be determined by power disparity or the so-called 
“hegemony stability thesis” under which power is a main currency.184 
Perhaps this is the reason why most criticisms on judicial activism are 
staged by political scientists or politicians whose main language is power, 
not norms.185  
Yet, for the past half century the gravity of governance in the 
global trading system has shifted from power to norms on account of a 
remarkable institutional evolution which has transformed an erstwhile 
contract to a “system.”186 As the former Director of the WTO Appellate 
Body Secretariat Debra Steger once put appositely, the GATT turned 
into “something greater than a contract that could be withdrawn from 
by any contracting party whenever it found the obligations too 
onerous.”187  In the same vein, the nature of the WTO remedies is no 
longer obsessed with the “rebalancing” of their original negotiational 
matrices of gives-and-takes, but more tuned in norm-building.188 In sum, 
the WTO as a system, or a “trade constitution,” 189  continuously 
                                                 
184 See Hans J. Morgenthau & George A. Lipsky, Political Limitations of the United 
Nations, in LAW AND POLITICS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 143, 150 (Hans J. Morgenthau 
& George A. Lipsky eds., 1953). 
185 See e.g., Judith Goldstein & Lisa L. Martin, Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and 
Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note, 54 INT’L ORG. 603, 603-32 (2000).  
186 See Sungjoon Cho, The Nature of Remedies in International Trade Law, 65 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 763, 769-71 [hereinafter Cho, Remedies]. 
187 Debra P. Steger, Afterword: The “Trade and …” Conundrum – A Commentary, 96 
AM. J. INT’L L. 135, 137 (2002) (emphasis added). In a similar context, it can be said 
that GATT evolved from an interest-driven “contract” to a norm-based “covenant.” See 
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 424-25 (2000). 
188 Cho, Remedies, supra note _ , at 792-95. 
189  See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 339 (2d ed 1997); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE 101-04 (1998); John H. 
Jackson, Reflections on International Economic Law, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 17, 25-
28 (1996); John H. Jackson, Perspectives on Regionalism in Trade Relations, 27 LAW 
& POL’Y INT’L BUS. 873 (1996); John O. McGinnis and Mark L. Movsesian, The World 
Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 573-83 (2000). Professor Cottier also notes 
“while the GATT was an agreement the purpose of which was almost exclusively the 
reduction of trade barriers, the WTO increasingly assumes constitutional functions in a 
globalizing economy (emphasis added).” Thomas Cottier, The WTO and 
Environmental Law: Some Issues and Ideas, Trade & Development Center Essay 
Series, available at http://www.itd.org/issues/essay1.htm. Cf. Brian F. Fitzgerald, 
Trade-Based Constitutionalism: The Framework for Universalizing Substantive 
International Law?, 5 U. MIAMI Y. B. INT’L L. 111, 129 (1996-97) (arguing that “the 
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transforms both the content of international trade law and state actors’ 
behaviors190 in a way which creates stability and predictability of the 
multilateral trading system.191 From this perspective, the alleged term of 
the Uruguay Round contract, which is raised by the U.S. in a self-serving 
way, could (and should) not determine legal destinies of measures in 
question. 
 Even if one arguendo adheres to a contract analogy in 
interpreting Article 17.6 (ii), the U.S. is just one party to the contract. Its 
interpretation of Article 17.6 (ii) must not be representative and thus 
authoritative. As the AB held in LAN, “the purpose of treaty 
interpretation under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention is to ascertain 
the common intentions of the parties, which “cannot be ascertained on 
the basis of the subjective and unilaterally determined “expectations” of 
one of the parties to a treaty.” 192  At the same time, “a proper 
interpretation also would have included an examination of the existence 
and relevance of subsequent practice,”193 such as strong objections to the 
zeroing practice expressed by other parties (to the contract), such as the 
Friends of Antidumping.194 
More importantly, the Article eventually fails to deliver what 
sovereigntists believe they have earned through a bargain. An alleged 
semblance of the Article to the Chevron doctrine does not necessarily 
accord this international norm the same doctrinal content as the 
putative domestic legal doctrine. To sovereigntists’ disappointment, 
Steven Croley and John Jackson eloquently demonstrated why Article 
17.6 (ii) of the Antidumping Agreement must not be interpreted like the 
Chevron doctrine.195 First, an explicit use of different languages in two 
situations, which are “permissible” in Article 17.6 (ii) and “reasonable” 
in the Chevron doctrine, tends to oppose a similar pattern of 
interpretation between the two. Second, as an international treaty, the 
Antidumping Agreement must be interpreted in accordance with those 
                                                                                                                                 
Uruguay Round of the GATT has presented us with a trade structure that no longer 
seeks only to deregulate or regulate in the names of some narrow universal principle of 
free trade, but that seeks to regulate sovereignties for the purpose of finding 
universality.”) 
190 ALVAREZ, supra note _ , at 588 (viewing that “international organizations have 
changed and are continuing to change the international sources of law, their 
substantive content, and the actors that make them, including states themselves.”). 
191 See notably WTO Panel Report on United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act 
of 1974, WT/DS152/R (Jan. 27, 2000), para. 7.76. 
192 European Communities – Custom Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, 
WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/DS68/AB/R, Appellate Body Report 
circulated on Jun. 5, 1998, para. 84. 
193 Id., para. 90. 
194 See infra note _. 
195  Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standards of 
Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 205-6 (1996). 
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interpretive principles under the Vienna Convention on the Law of the 
Treaties, especially Articles 31 and 32, not with the U.S.’ rules of 
statutory construction. Finally, they aptly pointed out that certain 
underlying rationales in the Chevron doctrine, such as “agency 
expertise” and “administrative or coordination” cannot find their places 
in the WTO context.196 
Carlos Manuel Vázquez has also echoed Croley and Jackson’s 
well-situated arguments. He criticized the Chevron deference in the 
context of the Antidumping Agreement. He has argued that “Chevron 
deference takes place in the context of horizontal judicial review, 
whereas WTO adjudication is vertical judicial review” and that the 
Chevron analogy, if used to interpret Article 17.6 (ii), would be 
tantamount to requiring that “federal courts defer to state court 
interpretations of federal law.” 197  Like Croley and Jackson, he also 
emphasized that the agency expertise rationale in the Chevron doctrine 
cannot stand valid in the WTO context. He incisively observed that 
applying this doctrine to the WTO would be tantamount to a U.S. court’s 
deferring its statutory interpretation to those who are being regulated.198 
The AB in U.S. – Continued Zeroing (2009) confirmed this 
futility of the Chevron analogy. The AB ruled that: 
273. (…) [A] permissible interpretation for purposes of the second 
sentence of Article 17.6(ii) is not the result of an inquiry that asks 
whether a provision of domestic law is "necessarily excluded" by 
the application of the Vienna Convention.  Such an approach 
subverts the hierarchy between the treaty and municipal law.  It 
is the proper interpretation of a covered agreement that is the 
enterprise with which Article 17.6(ii) is engaged, not whether the 
treaty can be interpreted consistently with a particular Member's 
municipal law or with municipal laws of Members as they existed 
at the time of the conclusion of the relevant treaty.199 
In conclusion, a contractarian analogy, which zeroing advocates 
employ in justifying its validity, tends to oversubscribe to a positivist 
understanding of the WTO and thus runs the risk of a misguided 
assessment of the measure.  
3. The Enlightened Meaning of Sovereignty 
A central theme revealed in those critics on the AB’s anti-zeroing 
jurisprudence is “sovereignty” which carries a hallmark of the Lotus 
principle. Under the well-known principle of public international law, 
                                                 
196 Id., at 206-11. 
197 Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Judicial Review in the United States and in the WTO: 
Some Similarities and Differences, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. Rev. 587, 603-4 (2004). 
198 Id. 
199 AB Report, U.S. – Continued Zeroing, supra note _ , para. 273. 
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sovereign states are capable of doing whatever they desire as long as no 
explicit prohibition exists under international law. 200  Following this 
logic, WTO members would be free to adopt the zeroing practice because 
the WTO Antidumping Code does not expressly ban such practice.  
Yet this “disarticulated” use of sovereignty may not do justice to 
the contemporary status of global market integration under the WTO 
system.201 There are plausible risks that protectionists may seek refugee 
in an overarching claim of sovereignty. It might be too extensive and 
inferential to accuse the AB’s decision on a regulatory issue such as 
zeroing of actually eroding the classical notion of sovereignty as “self-
government.” 202  Zeroing does not concern the sanctity of self-
determination and non-interference in the area of national security as 
stipulated and protected under the UN Charter. An “emotional appeal” 
through sovereignty hiding “a surrogate argument by opponents of some 
government proposal” 203  risks foreclosing otherwise meaningful and 
constructive discourses on the allocation of regulatory competence 
between the WTO and its members.204 
                                                 
200 See supra note _. 
201 Wendt, supra note _ , at 393; Pogge, supra note _.  
202 Kal Raustiala, Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law, 
6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 841, 875-6 (2003) [hereinafter Raustiala, Rethinking Sovereignty]. 
203  John H. Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: The United States 
Acceptance and Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results, 36 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 157, 187-88 (1997) [hereinafter Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty 
Debate]. See also Ronald A. Brand, Semantic Distinctions in an Age of Legal 
Convergence, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 6 (1996) (arguing that “theories of 
sovereignty borrowed from prior centuries can no longer accommodate economic and 
political reality at the end of the twentieth century”). Dan Sarooshi also documented a 
self-serving utilization of sovereignty as a surrogate argument for specific policy 
preferences. He emphasized the essentially “contestable” nature of sovereignty by 
submitting that “sovereignty is largely contingent upon the text in which it figures.” 
Dan Sarooshi, Sovereignty, Economic Autonomy, the United States, and the 
International Trading System: Representations of a Relationship, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 
651, 652 (2004). In other words, the concept of sovereignty, despite its “prima facie 
categorical use,” is subject to “conceptions and interpretations that should be evaluated 
and maybe amended in order to account better for the values encompassed by these 
concepts.” Id., at 654 (quoting Besson, Sovereignty in Conflict: Post-Sovereignty or 
Mere Change of Paradigms?, in THE SOVEREIGNTY OF STATES AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-4 (S. Tierney and C. Warbrick eds. 2004)). This view parallels 
that of Stephan Krasner who regarded sovereignty as “organized hypocrisy.” STEPHAN 
D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 9 (1999). 
204 John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept, 
97 AM. J. INT'L L. 782, 783-86 (2003). See also Raustiala, Rethinking Sovereignty, 
supra note _, at 843 (observing that “prevailing sovereignty-based critiques are 
instead usually disguised arguments about reallocations of power and the creation of 
incentives and disincentives for policy choices”). But cf. Philip R. Trimble, 
International Trade and the ‘Rule of Law,’ 83 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1027 (1985) 
(reviewing JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND: NATIONAL 
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Gravely, an invocation of a Baroque version of sovereignty runs 
the risk of nurturing a culture of “veto” among members, especially 
powerful members such as the U.S., and consequently poisoning the 
atmosphere of international cooperation. Those powerful countries tend 
to summon this ill-defined concept whenever they find compliance with 
international law and cooperation within an international organization 
politically inconvenient and cumbersome. This culture of veto may be 
percolated to adventurous isolationism which could provoke some 
governments to disconnect themselves from WTO despite the 
prohibitively high cost. 205  Undoubtedly, any of these consequences 
would be perilous both to the WTO and those countries which might 
self-excommunicate from the WTO in the name of sovereignty.  
It is imperative that in this highly interdependent international 
environment, trading nations, even the most powerful ones, should 
embrace a novel concept of sovereignty. Trading nations should realize 
that all international solutions necessarily involve “a degree of 
intrusiveness into domestic governance,” which stresses the necessity of 
a cooperative mechanism, including “appropriate allocation of power,” 
between international institutions and diverse national legal systems.206 
In other words, an altering international context requires a more flexible 
concept of sovereignty207 which departs from that which is symbolized 
by the peremptory exercise of unbridled power. Therefore, as Abraham 
Chayes and Antonia Chayes argued, nations should adopt the “new 
sovereignty” which is more mature, constructive and participatory.208 
For this purpose, trade norms should be “disaggregated” to make it 
possible to assess the relative advantages and disadvantages of 
reinforcing particular norms.209 This approach will enable governments 
to identify and focus on important “policy” issues that confront the 
entire international community, such as antidumping and the zeroing 
                                                                                                                                 
CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RULES (1984)) (arguing that “the kind of 
international law-making envisioned by the authors cannot be easily reconciled with 
the American political tradition”). 
205 Raustiala, Rethinking Sovereignty, supra note _, at 849. He aptly viewed that 
states in fact join various international organizations to “lock-in desired policy 
outcomes” and thus make any exit difficult. Id. 
206 John H. Jackson, International Economic Law in Times That Are Interesting, 3 J. 
INT. ECON. L. 3, 10-14. 
207  Cf. Jack Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and 
International Law, 52 STAN. L. REV. 959, 966 (2000) (reviewing STEPHEN D. KRASNER, 
ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999)) (introducing the “contingent and plastic” view of 
constructivists on sovereignty).  
208  See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: 
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 27 (1995). 
209 Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate, supra note _, at 187-88. 
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practice without any unnecessary rhetorical escalation.210 Ironically, this 
new approach to sovereignty can actually help governments achieve 
their own policy objectives by taming parochialism in the name of 
international obligations.211 
 
IV. The Legitimacy of Global Constitutional Lawmaking  
A. An Exogenous (Political) Test 
 Although the constitutional adjudication by the WTO tribunal 
may be firmly anchored by the WTO’s telos of anti-protectionism, and 
thus self-sustaining from the standpoint of the WTO as an autonomous 
international organization, such a macro, organizational sustainability is 
yet to be tested by the member-driven political dynamics. Some 
commentators cast serious doubts on the wisdom of constitutional 
adjudication itself. According to them, constitutional adjudication may 
be unsustainable because it tends to short-circuit the necessary and 
proper political process which the subject-matter of adjudication should 
have triggered. Therefore, they view that the AB’s interpretation must be 
tightly controlled by political safeguards to prevent it from creeping into 
the forbidden realm of constitutional adjudication. 
For example, Jeffrey Dunoff found constitutional narratives 
unpersuasive in general. Dunoff discovered a “puzzling disjunction” in 
the debates of trade constitution between the “deep disciplinary 
anxieties” of trade law scholars and a positivistic reality check that 
“neither WTO texts nor practices suggest that the WTO is a 
constitutional entity.”212 He warned that constitutional discourse as a 
rhetorical strategy adopted by trade law scholars might be “self-
defeating” in that it tends to invoke the very politics that it wants to 
avoid. 213  Dunoff might find the vindication of his warning in 
sovereigntists’ lambasting against the AB’s teleological interpretation.  
                                                 
210. Id. Cf. Arie Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: The Juridicization of International 
Trade Relations, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 775, 776 (1996-97) (asserting that nowadays 
more States wish to regulate trade relations by using norms, rather than through 
sovereignty and flexibility). 
211 McGinnis argued that the WTO, unlike many sovereigntists’ lamentation, reinforces 
its members’ sovereignty by protecting them from their Madisonian constitutional 
failures precipitated by rent-seeking special interests or “factions.” John O. McGinnis, 
The Political Economy of Global Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 381 (2000) 
212 Dunoff, supra note _, at 647, 649. He observed that “there is no constitutional court, 
no constitutional convention, no constitutional drafting process, and no readily 
identifiable constitutional moment.” and that “ on their face, the Uruguay Round texts 
lack a number of features often associated with constitutional entities.” Id., at 650-51. 
213 Id., at 649.  
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In a similar fashion, one might submit that the very notion of 
trade constitution or trade constitutionalism as an apolitical discipline 
would be even undesirable. According to Klabbers, the “idea of 
overcoming politics by insisting on adhering to certain fixed values” 
would be unlikely to work since “reference to those values itself is 
immensely and intensely political.”214 Furthermore, Robert Howse and 
Kalypso Nicolaidis viewed that the WTO constitution as a Madisonian 
pre-commitment to resist the rent-seeking protectionism by special 
interest groups might be detrimental because “it is an attempt to take 
politics out of the global equation when on the contrary it needs to be 
brought back in.”215 
 All these criticisms are not without merits. In a formal matter, the 
WTO panel or the AB is merely to “assist” the Dispute Settlement Body, 
i.e., the General Council, to “settle” disputes between Members by 
delivering their “recommendations.” 216  More importantly, these 
recommendations should not “add to or diminish” members’ rights and 
obligations. 217  Also, overemphasizing this judicial governance in the 
WTO, especially through a constitutional lens, risks trivializing 
recognizable political checks against the WTO panel or the AB, 
including the possible overriding of any panel or the AB decision by the 
WTO members’ “authoritative interpretation.”218  These risks tend to 
invite more fundamental criticisms regarding the WTO tribunal’s 
alleged lack of accountability or more broadly the democracy deficit. 
One of these critics contend that the WTO produce “quasi-
constitutional” rules (“generativity”) flowing from the confidential WTO 
tribunal (“insularity”). 219  According to this position, the WTO’s 
substantive virtue, i.e., free trade, may become a potential threat to 
democracy of its members, including (or especially) the U.S. in the 
absence of any democratic disciplines, such as those under the U.S.’ 
Administrative Procedural Act.220 
                                                 
214 Jan Klabbers, Constitutionalism Lite, 1 INT'L ORG. L. REV. (2004) 31, 54 (quoted in 
Dunoff, supra note _ , at 665) 
215 See Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Legitimacy and Global Governance: Why 
Constitutionalizing the WTO is a Step Too Far, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND 
LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENIUM 227 (Roger B. 
Porter et al eds. 2001). 
216 DSU, supra note _, art.19.1. 
217 Id., arts. 3.2, 19.2 
218 WTO Agreement, supra note _, art. 9.2. 
219 Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 401, 415 (2000). 
220 Id., at 418-19. Ironically, the way in which certain Western countries administer 
antidumping measures domestically fails to meet their own democratic standards. For 
example, the U.S. Administrative Procedural Act does not apply to antidumping 
proceedings, raising due process questions in the antidumping administration. See 
Theodore W. Kassinger, Antidumping Duty Investigations, in LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
UNITED STATES REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1, 16-20 (Charles R.  Johnston, Jr. 
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One might suspect that those political risks are a certain price 
that WTO members should willingly pay to secure the integrity of “an 
integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system.”221 Yet 
these risks might not necessarily be high, in particular as long as 
domestic political economy could accommodate the AB’s constitutional 
adjudication. Judith Goldstein and Richard Steinberg insightfully 
observed that the U.S. Congress has recently tolerated “de facto 
delegation” of trade authority to the WTO’s judicial law-making 
function.222  They attributed such domestic political tolerance to the 
WTO’s judicial activism to certain transformative features in the U.S. 
trade politics.223 First, export-oriented producers have propped up their 
lobbying effects as they have witnessed “a clear and credible loss” from 
protection touted by import-competing groups. Second, trade 
liberalization tends to be “self-reinforcing” since these protectionist 
lobbies “peel off” as they become unable to sustain protection. Third, 
domestic “elites and leaders” tend to regard trade liberalization and 
market openness advantageous to the national interest. 
 B. An Endogenous (Legal) Test 
 In contrast to the aforementioned exogenous (political) test, an 
apolitical, i.e., normative, foundation for constitutional adjudication 
derives nowhere but from an “internal” dimension of law, i.e., the way in 
which members interpret, react and respond to those constitutional 
decisions of the WTO tribunal, not as “one-time grudging compliance,” 
but “habitual internalized obedience.”224 
 This self-legitimizing osmosis of constitutional adjudication from 
the WTO level into the domestic legal realm does not remain a mere 
academic imagination. Empirical confirmations are legion as to real 
world examples of such legal osmosis. The reactions from the EU and 
the U.S. government to the AB’s anti-zeroing decisions provide cases in 
                                                                                                                                 
ed., 1989); Hilary K. Josephs, The Multinational Corporation, Integrated 
International Production, and the United States Antidumping Laws, 5 TUL. J. INT'L & 
COMP. L. 51, 66 (1997). See also Elof Hansson, Inc.v. United States, 41 Cust. Ct. 519, 
528 (1958) (ruling that the APA was not applicable to dumping investigations). 
Moreover, even if domestic industries’ first attempt does not prevail in an antidumping 
complaint, they can re-file the same complaint until they eventually prevail because the 
doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel does not apply to the antidumping 
proceeding unlike other civil procedures. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(a) & 1673a(a). See also 
Josephs, supra note _, at 66. 
221 WTO Agreement, supra note _, pmbl. 
222 Judith L. Goldstein & Richard H. Steinberg, Negotiate or Litigate?: Effects of WTO 
Judicial Delegation on U.S. Trade Politics, UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW, LAW & ECONOMICS 
RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, No. 07-14, at 36-37. 
223 Id.  
224 Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 
2655 (1997).  
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point. For example, although the EU was one of the long-standing users 
of the zeroing practice, it has boldly changed its policy direction in a way 
which fully conforms to the AB’s ruling since it lost the very first case in 
EC – Bed Linen. Instead of resisting to the AB’s decisions, it has elected 
to go after another main user, i.e., the U.S.225 Even the U.S. government 
(DOC) has recently modified, albeit partially, its long-standing zeroing 
practice in the weighted-average-to-weighted-average comparison in an 
attempt to comply with the AB’s decisions, despite severe resistance 
from the special interest groups as well as the Congress which is 
captured by these groups.226 
 This legal osmosis or “internalization” of the WTO’s 
constitutional adjudication leads to a symbiotic co-existence between 
the WTO system and domestic legal regimes. In fact, trade constitution 
can contribute even to achieving domestic constitutional goals since the 
former can provide an effective check against a Madisonian failure 
(parochialism) in the domestic arena.227 Public choice theorists teach us 
that gains from trade are often underrepresented while its costs are 
overrepresented. 228  Under these circumstances, constitutional 
adjudication tends to empower local voices for free trade and 
competition. For example, since the WTO rulings on zeroing the U.S. 
domestic consumer groups have stepped up their lobbying efforts to the 
government with a view to the elimination of all zeroing practices which 
serve the interests of certain domestic producers at the expense of U.S. 
consumers and consuming industries.229  
                                                 
225 See supra pt. II, § C. 
226 71 Fed. Reg. 77,722 (Dec. 27, 2006); Rossella Brevetti, Commerce Makes Change in 
Dumping Methodology to Comply with WTO Case, 24 INT’L TRADE REP. 26, Jan. 4, 
2007. This is an example of internalization through “executive action,” such as the 
change of administrative interpretation. Koh, supra note _ , at 2657. 
227 See Judith L. Goldstein & Richard H. Steinberg, Regulatory Shift: The Rise of 
Judicial Liberalization at the WTO, UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW, LAW & ECONOMICS 
RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, No. 07-15, at 2-3 (arguing that the WTO’s regulatory shift 
from the legislative to the judicial sector by “freeing member states from the capture by 
entrenched domestic interests”).  
228 See Sungjoon Cho, Toward a New Economic Constitution: Judicial Disciplines on 
Trade Politics, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 167, 184-86 (2007). 
229 See Consuming Industries Trade Action Coalition (CITAC), Rebuttal Comments on 
the Commerce Department’s “Zeroing” Proposal, May 4, 2006 (urging the Commerce 
Department to “eliminate zeroing from all antidumping calculation methodologies”), 
available at 
http://www.citac.info/about/issues/zeroing/CITAC_On_Zeroing_2300285_1.pdf.; 
Robin Lanier, A Letter to Secretary of Commerce (Re: “Zeroing” of Duties), Jan. 6, 
2005 (proposing to “eliminate the practice of zeroing in all dumping cases”). Harold 
Koh defines this phenomenon as “legislative internalization” which “occurs when 
domestic lobbying embeds international law norms into binding domestic legislation 
or even constitutional law that officials of a noncomplying government must then obey 
as part of the domestic legal fabric.” Koh, supra note _ , at 2657.  
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Even if certain domestic producers may attempt to preserve the 
zeroing practice in the domestic court which usually renders huge 
deference to agencies, such as the DOC, under the Chevron doctrine, the 
court can still respect the decisions of the WTO (AB) under the 
Charming Betsy doctrine, which prescribes that the U.S. law should be 
interpreted in a way which is consistent with international law.230 In 
other words, between two possible statutory constructions of the 
antidumping statute, i.e., one which does permit zeroing and the other 
which does not, the U.S. court could choose the latter since the WTO 
tribunal unambiguously ruled against zeroing. To this extent, any 
modicum of deference which the DOC would have enjoyed under the 
second prong of the Chevron is squeezed to nil.231  
In sum, this “transnational legal process,” which internalizes the 
WTO norms on zeroing via the executive, legislative and judicial 
channels, continuously enhances the WTO members’ susceptibility of 
the WTO’s constitutional adjudication. As WTO members repeat and 
regularize this process, and thus as domestic law becomes enmeshed 
with “sticky” international law,232 their compliance with the outcome of 
constitutional adjudication becomes ever closer to a “default pattern.” 233 
Furthermore, in most cases trade constitution is firmly in sync with 
fundamental principles of domestic (constitutional) law, such as free 
interstate commerce and anti-parochialism. This “sovereignty-
                                                 
230 This situation may fall within the rubric of “judicial internalization” which Harold 
Koh defines as an implicit incorporation of international law into the domestic legal 
system through interpreting existing statutes harmoniously with international law or 
as an explicit incorporation via “transnational public law litigation.” Koh, supra note _ , 
at 2657. 
231 A recent North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Article 1904 binational 
panel (the Mittal panel) has followed the AB’s anti-zeroing jurisprudence by invoking 
the Charming Betsy doctrine. NAFTA Article 1904.2 requires this tribunal whose 
mandate is a judicial review on government’s decisions on trade remedy issues such as 
zeroing to apply the same laws, regulations and even standards of review which a court 
of a defending country (the U.S. in this dispute). In this sense, the Mittal panel spoke 
on behalf of the U.S. court. It ruled that “zeroing seems inconsistent (…) with both the 
underlying principle of the Charming Betsy canon, to respect the law of nations 
wherever possible, and the United States’ Uruguay Round negotiation goal of obtaining 
an effective dispute-resolution system.” In the Matter of Carbon and Certain Alloy 
Steel Wire Rod from Canada, USA-CDA-2006-1094-04, Nov. 28, 2007, at 38. But see 
Elizabeth C. Seastrum, Chevron Deference and Charming Betsy: Is There a Place for 
the Schooner in the Standard of Review of Commerce Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duty Determinations?, 13 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 229, 238-39 (2003) 
(concluding that the Charming Betsy doctrine should not undermine the operation of 
the Chevron doctrine). 
232 Koh, supra note _ , at 2654-55. 
233 Id. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note _ , at 935 (observing that some international 
tribunals’ rulings can “mobilize compliance constituencies to press governments to 
adhere to their treaty obligations”) (emphasis added).  
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enhancing” aspect of internalization reinforces its self-legitimizing 
nature.234 Under these circumstances, members’ “loyalty” on the WTO 
regime mitigates, or even replaces, their initial demand for “voice” or 
threat of “exit.”235  
 
Conclusion 
 This article has challenged major critiques to the recent WTO 
case law which has invalidated zeroing in a radical departure from the 
old GATT case law legalizing the same practice. The article has argued 
that critics to the AB’s zeroing decisions misconstrue the nature of the 
WTO, its judicial review, and sovereignty itself. The article has also 
demonstrated why, and how, the recent WTO zeroing jurisprudence can 
be appreciated as a form of constitutional adjudication. Finally, it has 
contended that constitutional adjudication is self-legitimizing to the 
extent that such adjudication communicates with the domestic legal 
system via various forms of internalization, be it a judicial 
accommodation, as regards the Charming Betsy doctrine, or a policy 
change at the executive level. After all, compliance leads to legitimacy 
insomuch as legitimacy renders compliance pull.  
 This mutually reinforcing dynamics between internalization and 
legitimacy of constitutional adjudication on zeroing may crystallize into 
a certain cultural phenomenon. In this regard, “constitutional culture” 
may be defined as the “cultural cohesion that habitually accepts the 
propriety and necessity of constitutional compliance.” 236  In fact, 
internalization itself is “constitutive” and thus facilitative of 
constitutional culture.237 The WTO’s constitutional culture denotes the 
“generally shared” and “intersubjective” understanding of the WTO’s 
ultimate goal (telos) and the normative universe (nomos) in which such 
goal is pursued.238 Within the WTO’s nomos defined by its telos, an 
unremitting interaction, or discourse, among members of the global 
                                                 
234 See ALVAREZ, supra note _ , at 618. Cf. Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: 
The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by National Courts, 102 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 241, 272-73 (2008) (suggesting that inter-judicial coalitions could enhance 
democratic governance). 
235 See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 76-105 (1970). 
236 Allan Ides, The Emerging Transnational Constitution: Introduction, 37 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 187, 188 (2003).  
237 Koh, supra note _ , at 2646. 
238 See notably Lang, supra note _, at 84-85, 95, 105-6 (employing a “constructivist” 
perspective on the WTO system); Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 
97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983) (observing that “no set of legal institutions or 
prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning.”); id., 
at 9 (defining nomos as a “present world constituted by a system of tension between 
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[2009] Global Constitutional Lawmaking 
 
48 
trading community forms, and fortifies, the WTO’s constitutional 
culture via a communitarian mechanism of habituation. 
 Importantly, the constitutional culture should also be didactic. 
The WTO’s constitutional jurisprudence, no matter how far it has been 
evolved thus far, is still remote and inaccessible to ordinary people. 
Most people, even scholars in this field, associate it with esoteric codes 
which can be deciphered only by certain cognoscenti.239 Under such a 
low level of awareness, the legal force cannot overcome the short-term 
protectionist politics which is often well-organized and thus very 
effective in capturing trade policy-makers. Therefore, the public should 
become further educated on the issue of international trade law and 
trade constitution so that well-informed deliberation, not misleading 
protectionist banners, guides their political choices.240 The necessity of 
public education and social marketing on the WTO’s constitutional 
jurisprudence may be analogous to the reason why American citizens, 
not only legal scholars, are taught on certain paramount constitutional 
jurisprudence, such as Marbury and Brown. At this juncture, the 
academia bears a critical responsibility of framing and dispersing 
discourses on the trade constitution and constitutional adjudication.241 
Such discourses will eventually provide the public with helpful heuristics 
with which to better comprehend international trade law, thereby 
paving a propitious ground for the WTO’s constitutional culture.  
In conclusion, the WTO’s constitutional culture liberates us from 
a long-standing “positivist nostrum” based on an outmoded belief that 
“multilateral mechanisms for making global law, binding on the 
international community as a whole, do not exist.” 242  Only this 
liberation can disabuse trading nations of their misguided mercantilist 
interests, which zeroing represents, and redefine their identities and 
interests within the global trading system from impervious sovereign 
entities to enlightened norm-builders.243 
                                                 
239  See Sungjoon Cho, A New Agenda for Peace: International Trade Law as a 
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242 Alvarez, supra note _ , at 586-87. 
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